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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
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written by the Board of Associate Editors for the North Dakota Law 
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW–DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION–STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
LENTZ V. SPRYNCZNATYK 
 
Aaron Lentz appealed a North Dakota Department of Transportation 
officer’s decision to suspend his commercial driver’s license for ninety-nine 
years when the officer considered Lentz’s past driving under the influence 
(DUI) conviction in rendering the suspension.1  Lentz argued that a statute 
permitting lifetime suspension of a commercial driver’s license should not 
be used retroactively to consider a previous DUI offense that occurred prior 
to the statute’s enactment.2  The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the 
judgment of the hearing officer, finding that the officer properly interpreted 
the statute.3 
Aaron Lentz acquired his commercial driver’s license in 1998.4  The 
North Dakota Legislative Assembly enacted a statute, effective August 1, 
2003, whereby a commercial driver’s license would be suspended for life 
upon the accumulation of two DUI offenses.5  Lentz received his first DUI 
conviction while driving a noncommercial vehicle on September 5, 2000.6  
Lentz’s first conviction occurred prior to the statute’s enactment, but he 
received a second DUI conviction on November 17, 2003, which was after 
the statute’s enactment.7 
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Lentz argued that the 
statute was improperly applied because one of his DUI convictions 
occurred before the statute’s enactment.8  Since the legal question posed on 
review regarded the interpretation of a statute, the agency’s decision was 
fully reviewable.9 
First, the court noted that no North Dakota statute is retroactive “unless 
it is expressly declared to be so.”10  Here, the statute became effective on 
August 1, 2003, and provided that “for a second conviction of driving while 
under the influence or being under the influence of a controlled substance or 
refusal to be tested while operating a noncommercial motor vehicle, a 
 
1. Lentz v. Spryncznatyk, 2006 ND 27, ¶ 1, 708 N.W.2d 859, 860. 
2. Id. ¶ 1, 708 N.W.2d at 860. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. ¶ 2 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. ¶ 5, 708 N.W.2d at 861. 
9. Id. ¶ 4 (citing Bjerklie v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2005 ND 178, ¶ 9, 704 N.W.2d 818, 
821). 
10. Id. ¶ 6 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-10 (2005)). 
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commercial driver’s license holder must be disqualified from operating a 
commercial motor vehicle for life.”11  Based on this language, Lentz argued 
that because his first DUI conviction occurred prior to the enactment of the 
statute, the court should not consider his previous conviction.12  Instead, 
Lentz claimed that his commercial driver’s license should only be sus-
pended for one year.13  Furthermore, Lentz claimed that if his license was 
suspended for longer than one year, then the legislature’s presumption 
against retroactive statutes would be violated because the subsection did not 
expressly contain retroactive language.14 
However, based on two analogous decisions, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court rejected Lentz’s argument and affirmed the holding.15  The 
court indicated that “the enactment of a change of consequence in . . . 
driving privileges d[oes] not amount to a retroactive application of [a] 
statute.”16 
The court examined an analogous decision, Rott v. North Dakota 
Department of Transportation,17 where a minor accumulated six points 
against her driving record for a single traffic violation, which resulted in the 
suspension of her driver’s license.18  Rott claimed that she was licensed as a 
class D driver for two years prior to the enactment of the applicable statute, 
and when she received the traffic violation the statute was applied to her 
retroactively because the status of her driver’s license changed.19  But the  
court rejected Rott’s argument because a statute could only be labeled as 
retroactive if it “operate[d] on transactions that have already occurred, or on 
rights existing before its enactment.”20 
 
11. Id. ¶ 7 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.2-10(8) (2005)). 
12. Id. ¶ 8. 
13. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.2-10(7) (2005)).  N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.2-10(7) 
states:  
For a first conviction of driving while under the influence of alcohol or being under 
the influence of a controlled substance or refusal to be tested while operating a non-
commercial motor vehicle, a commercial driver’s license holder must be disqualified 
from operating a commercial motor vehicle for one year.   
Id. 
14. Id. ¶ 9, 708 N.W.2d at 862. 
15. Id. ¶ 9 (referencing Rott v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2000 ND 175, ¶ 10, 617 N.W.2d 475, 
477; State v. Haverluk, 432 N.W.2d 871, 874 (N.D. 1988)). 
16. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Rott, ¶ 12, 617 N.W.2d at 478). 
17. 2000 ND 175, 617 N.W.2d 475. 
18. Lentz, 2006 ND 27, ¶ 10, 708 N.W.2d 859, 862 (citing Rott, ¶ 2, 617 N.W.2d at 476).  
The North Dakota Century Code section 39-06-01.1 provides that the accumulation of more than 
five points against a minor’s driving record calls for the suspension of driving privileges.  N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 39-06-01.1 (2005). 
19. Lentz, ¶ 10, 708 N.W.2d at 862. 
20. Id. (citing Rott, ¶¶ 7, 10, 617 N.W.2d at 477). 
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The court applied a similar rationale in another analogous decision, 
State v. Haverluk,21 where it held that an increased penalty based on past 
convictions was not an application of a retroactive statute.22  Haverluk had 
three prior DUI convictions, and a statute provided for an increased penalty 
for a fourth DUI conviction.23  On Haverluk’s fourth conviction, he argued 
that because three of his DUI convictions occurred prior to the statute’s 
enactment, the increased penalty could not be applied to him.24  But the 
court found that because the triggering behavior occurred after the enact-
ment of the statute, the increased penalty was not a retroactive application.25 
Applying Rott and Haverluk, Lentz’s arguments failed.26  In affirming 
the conviction and suspension of Lentz’s commercial driver’s license for 
ninety-nine years, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that even though 
Lentz’s first conviction occurred prior to the statute’s enactment, the statute 
had not been applied retroactively.27  Furthermore, the court found addi-
tional support from neighboring state opinions, which upheld the use of 
prior drunk driving convictions to increase penalties for subsequent DUI 
offenses.28 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW–INTERSTATE WILDLIFE VIOLATOR COMPACT– 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
GRAY V. NORTH DAKOTA GAME & FISH DEP’T 
 
David B. Gray, a North Dakota resident, was convicted of trespass to 
hunt in Wyoming on April 16, 2004, in a Wyoming circuit court.29  Gray 
had crossed private land with “No Hunting” and “No Trespassing” postings 
in order to reach public land for hunting purposes.30  Following appeal to a 
Wyoming district court, Gray’s conviction was upheld and he was banned 
 
21. 432 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 1988). 
22. Lentz, ¶ 11, 708 N.W.2d at 862 (citing State v. Haverluk, 432 N.W.2d 871, 873-74 (N.D. 
1988)). 
23. Id. ¶ 11. 
24. Id. (citing Haverluk, 432 N.W.2d at 872-73) (showing that section 39-08-01 of the North 
Dakota Century Code provides that a “fourth or subsequent DUI conviction in a seven-year 
period” would enhance the penalty to a class A misdemeanor). 
25. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Haverluk, 432 N.W.2d at 873). 
26. Id. ¶ 13, 708 N.W.2d at 863. 
27. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. 
28. Id. (citing Sims v. State, 556 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Ark. 1977); State v. Sedillos, 112 P.3d 
854, 856 (Kan. 2005); State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 185 (Minn. 1983); Alexander v. 
Commonwealth of Penn., Dep’t. of Transp., 880 A.2d 552, 561 (Pa. 2005)). 
29. Gray v. N.D. Game & Fish Dep’t, 2005 ND 204, ¶ 2, 706 N.W.2d 614, 617. 
30. Id. ¶ 2, 706 N.W.2d at 617. 
        
2006] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1037 
from hunting, fishing, and trapping in Wyoming until 2006.31  Because 
Wyoming and North Dakota are members of the Interstate Wildlife Violator 
Compact (hereinafter “Compact”), information regarding Gray’s suspended 
hunting privileges was submitted to the North Dakota Game and Fish 
Department (hereinafter “Department”) on October 12, 2004.32  Gray was 
informed via letter that his North Dakota hunting privileges were similarly 
suspended.33  Both an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter “ALJ”) and, 
on further appeal, the District Court of Burleigh County affirmed the 
Department’s action.34  An appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court 
followed thereafter.35 
The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the ALJ in 
the same manner as did the district court.36  The court decided only whether 
a “reasoning mind reasonably could have decided the agency’s findings 
were proven by the weight of the evidence from the entire record.”37  
Similarly, the court did not make independent findings of fact, nor 
substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ.38  Furthermore, the court 
stated that if the ALJ’s findings were supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence, then the ALJ’s order would be upheld.39  Thus, the court would 
affirm the order of the ALJ unless any of the following were present: 
1. The order [wa]s not in accordance with the law. 
2. The order [wa]s in violation of the constitutional rights of the 
appellant. 
3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in 
the proceedings before the agency. 
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the 
appellant a fair hearing. 
5. The findings of fact made by the agency [we]re not supported 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency [we]re not 
supported by its findings of fact. 
 
31. Id. 
32. Id. ¶ 3. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. ¶ 4, 706 N.W.2d at 618 
36. Id. ¶ 7 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-49 (2004)). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
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7. The findings of fact made by the agency d[id] not sufficiently 
address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant. 
8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency d[id] not 
sufficiently explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting any 
contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an administra-
tive law judge.40 
First, Gray argued that the Department should not have suspended his 
North Dakota hunting privileges on the basis of the Wyoming trespass to 
hunt conviction.41  Under the Compact, the “participating states agree to 
honor other participating states’ wildlife license suspensions” to promote 
proper wildlife resource management.42 
[P]articipating states may recognize the suspension of license 
privileges of any person by any participating state as though the 
violation resulting in the suspension had occurred in their state and 
could have been the basis for suspension of license privileges in 
their state . . . [and] shall communicate suspension information to 
other participating states in form and content as contained in the 
compact manual.43 
Therefore, after receiving notice of Gray’s suspension from Wyoming, the 
Department had to determine if the violation could have led to a suspension 
in North Dakota.44 
In Wyoming, Gray was found guilty of violating a statute that 
prohibited entering private land, without the owner’s permission, to hunt.45  
North Dakota also imposes limits on hunting private land, such that “no 
person may hunt or pursue game, or enter for those purposes, upon legally 
posted land belonging to another without first obtaining the permission of 
the person legally entitled to grant the same.”46  While North Dakota pre-
sumes that the hunting of private land is legal when the land is not legally 
posted, Wyoming requires express permission from the landowner to 
hunt.47  Gray contended that because the two statutes differed, his violation 
in Wyoming could not be recognized in North Dakota.48 
 
40. Id. ¶ 6 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46 (2004)). 
41. Id. ¶ 8. 
42. Id. ¶ 9. 
43. Id. at 619 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-16-01, art. 5, §§ 1-2 (2004)). 
44. Id. ¶ 10, 706 N.W.2d at 619 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-16-03 (2004)). 
45. Id. ¶ 11 (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-3-305(b) (2005)). 
46. Id. ¶ 12, 706 N.W.2d at 620 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-18 (2004)). 
47. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-17 (2004)). 
48. Id. 
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The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the Department 
properly interpreted the law by suspending Gray’s hunting privileges.49  
The court held that participating statutes need not be identical, as the 
purpose of the Compact is to “promote compliance with the statutes . . . re-
lating to management of wildlife resources.”50  The court noted that Gray’s 
theory would strip the Compact of any real meaning because wildlife 
statutes among the participating states are not identical.51  The court also 
stated that had Gray’s actions taken place in North Dakota, his privileges 
would have been similarly suspended.52  Finally, the court disposed of 
Gray’s argument by claiming that the “No Trespassing” and “No Hunting” 
signs posted on the Wyoming land did not conform to North Dakota’s 
statute.  The court held that the use of “technical requirements of North 
Dakota law as a defense to reciprocal enforcement of the Wyoming convic-
tion in North Dakota” did not clear Gray of his violation.53 
Next, Gray argued that the Department erred by giving full faith and 
credit to a Wyoming conviction that was wrongfully obtained.54  At trial, 
the Wyoming court allowed an amendment of the criminal citation, and 
Gray claimed that this amendment defeated his defense.55  The citation 
listed an erroneous location as the place of the offense, and he stated as a 
defense that he was innocent of the criminal citation with respect to that 
location.56  But when the citation was amended to list the correct location of 
the offense, Gray claimed that his defense was defeated.57  However, the 
Wyoming district court stated that Gray’s brief recognized the citation’s 
error prior to trial, and because of this acknowledgment, he was not preju-
diced by the amended citation.58  Similarly, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court followed the reasoning of the Wyoming district court and found that 
there was no evidence of a due process violation or prejudice arising from 
the amended criminal complaint, and therefore, the court held that it was 
proper to give full faith and credit to Gray’s conviction.59 
 
49. Id. ¶ 16, 706 N.W.2d at 621. 
50. Id. ¶ 13, 706 N.W.2d at 620 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-16-01, art. 1, § 2(a) 
(2004)). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. ¶ 15, 706 N.W.2d at 621. 
53. Id.  
54. Id. ¶ 17. 
55. Id. ¶ 19. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. See id. (citing State v. Higgins, 2004 ND 115, ¶ 5, 680 N.W.2d 645, 647) (stating that the 
trial court has discretion to amend a criminal complaint if the amendment does not prejudice the 
defendant). 
59. Id. 
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Gray then claimed the Compact violated the compact clause of the 
Unites States Constitution because “no state shall, without the consent of 
Congress . . . enter into any . . . compact with another state.”60  The Depart-
ment first claimed that the states had previously been allowed to enter 
compacts “for . . . mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and in the 
enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies.”61  In addition, 
the Department argued that the United States Supreme Court had already 
settled the question of when interstate agreements fell within the compact 
clause:62 
When an agreement between states is not directed to the formation 
of any combination tending to increase the political power in the 
states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the supremacy 
of the United States, the agreement does not fall within the scope 
of the compact clause and will not be invalidated for lack of 
congressional consent.63 
Furthermore, the Department noted that the Compact was similar to the 
Drivers License Compact and Non-Resident Violator Compact, both of 
which specifically related to the licensing and enforcement of automobile 
drivers, and as a result, both were found to be outside the scope of the 
compact clause.64 
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that “[p]rotection of the 
wildlife of the State is peculiarly within the police power, and the State has 
great latitude in determining what means are appropriate for its protec-
tion.”65  The court found that the Compact’s system of information sharing 
and enforcement of wildlife violations did not intrude on the United States’ 
supremacy, and therefore, the Compact did not require Congressional 
consent.66 
Gray then claimed that the Department’s suspension of his hunting 
privileges, based on the Wyoming conviction, violated double jeopardy 
 
60. Id. ¶ 20 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10). 
61. Id. ¶ 21, 706 N.W.2d at 621-22 (citing 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2005) (providing that 
congressional consent is granted under such circumstances)). 
62. Id. at 622. 
63. Id. (citting Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 
159, 175-76 (1985)). 
64. Id. (citing Koterba v. Commonwealth of Penn. Dep’t of Transp., 736 A.2d 761, 765-66 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (explaining that the Driver’s License Compact is an interstate agreement 
which does not need “Congressional approval” because its policy does not threaten the supremacy 
of the United States and no state has acted beyond its granted powers through its association in the 
Driver’s License Compact)). 
65. Id. ¶ 22 (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 391 (1978)). 
66. Id. 
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principles.67  Gray argued that North Dakota’s suspension of his license was 
a successive punishment for the same crime.68  The court stated that the 
Drivers License Compact, which suspended the driving privileges of viola-
tors, had been held as a legitimate civil remedial sanction that did not 
violate double jeopardy principles.69  Because the Compact was held in a 
comparable light to the Drivers License Compact, the court held that the 
Department’s suspension of Gray’s hunting privileges was “a legitimate 
civil remedial measure that serves the goal of protecting wildlife resources 
as well as the safety of persons and property . . . .”70  Therefore, the Depart-
ment’s suspension of Gray’s hunting privileges did not violate double 
jeopardy.71 
Next, Gray argued that his procedural due process rights had been 
violated by the Department because he was not provided with notice and 
hearing before suspension.72  The court’s analysis balanced Gray’s right for 
procedural fairness against the government’s competing interests.73  In past 
decisions, the court has held that pre-suspension hearings were not neces-
sary to meet due process requirements where a driver’s license suspension 
was a private concern because the protection of public interest outweighed 
the need for a pre-suspension hearing.74  The court noted an Ohio Supreme 
Court case, City of Maumee v. Gabriel,75 which held that an individual does 
not have a substantial private interest to possess a driver’s license because 
the state has an interest to provide a safe environment for the public, and 
once the state removes drivers who fail to meet the state’s laws and regula-
tions, due process requirements are satisfied.76 
Analogizing these previous holdings in the context of the Compact, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the State’s interest in enforcing and 
complying with wildlife hunting laws outweighed Gray’s hunting privi-
leges.77  Furthermore, the court concluded that Gray’s due process rights 
 
67. Id. ¶ 23. 
68. Id. ¶ 24, 706 N.W.2d at 623 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
69. Id. ¶ 25 (citing Marshall v. Dep’t of Transp., 48 P.3d 666, 671 (Idaho  Ct. App. 2002)). 
70. Id. ¶ 26. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. ¶ 27, 706 N.W.2d at 624. 
73. Id. ¶ 28 (citing Wahl v. Morton County Soc. Servs., 1998 ND 48, ¶ 6, 574 N.W.2d 859, 
862). 
74. Id. ¶ 29 (citing State v. Harm, 200 N.W.2d 387, 388 (N.D. 1972). 
75. 518 N.E.2d 558 (Ohio 1988). 
76. Gray, ¶ 29, 706 N.W.2d at 624 (citing City of Maumee, 518 N.E.2d at 562 (Ohio 1988)). 
77. Id. ¶ 30. 
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were not violated when the trial court suspended his hunting privileges 
without first providing him pre-suspension notice and hearing.78 
Next, Gray asserted that his equal protection rights had been violated 
by the changes that the North Dakota Legislative Assembly made to the 
language of the Compact.79  Gray argued that North Dakota gave the 
Department the discretion to punish violators with suspensions when it 
changed the language in the Compact from “shall” to “may.”80  Therefore, 
the court analyzed Gray’s equal protection challenge as a selective prosecu-
tion challenge.81  But the court quickly noted that selective enforcement or 
prosecution, without improper motives, does not violate equal protection.82  
Because Gray failed to establish that “other similarly situated individuals 
have not had their hunting privileges suspended,” the court concluded that 
his equal protection rights were not violated by either the Department’s 
action or by the changes that the legislature made with respect to the 
Compact’s wording.83 
Finally, Gray argued that the Compact was an unconstitutional ex post 
facto law.84  The court explained that an ex post facto law is “one that 
makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was inno-
cent when done, criminal.”85  Looking to the facts of the case, the North 
Dakota Legislative Assembly enacted the Compact in 2001, and Gray was 
convicted in Wyoming in 2004.86  Consequently, the court dismissed 
Gray’s ex post facto argument because North Dakota’s law wasn’t passed 
after his conviction, and the court found all other contentions without 
merit.87  Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment 
of the ALJ.88 
In a special concurrence, Chief Justice VandeWalle noted his 
uneasiness with North Dakota’s version of the Compact.89  Chief Justice 
 
78. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-16-05(1) (2004) (stating that a prompt post-
suspension hearing will be provided upon request of the violator)). 
79. Id. ¶ 31, 706 N.W.2d at 624-25. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. ¶ 32, 706 N.W.2d at 625. 
82. Id. (citing Gale v. N.D. Bd. of Podiatric Med., 1997 ND 83, ¶ 32, 562 N.W.2d 878, 886). 
83. Id. ¶ 32-33 (citing State v. Mathisen, 356 N.W.2d 129, 133 (N.D. 1984) (holding that a 
defendant claiming selective prosecution must establish other similarly situated individuals have 
not been prosecuted and the prosecution of the defendant is based upon constitutionally 
impermissible considerations)). 
84. Id. ¶ 34. 
85. Id. ¶ 35 (citing State v. Burr, 1999 ND 143, ¶ 10, 598 N.W.2d 147, 152). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. ¶ 35-36. 
88. Id. ¶ 36. 
89. Id. ¶ 38. 
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VandeWalle cautioned that the legislature’s grant of discretion to the 
Department may have been well intended, but it left open the possibility for 
a later defendant to successfully argue that an improper selective prosecu-
tion or an inappropriate delegation of legislative power has occurred.90 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW–INTOXILYZER TEST & ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL–
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
ERIKSMOEN V. N.D. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 
 
In Eriksmoen v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,91 
Kjerstin Eriksmoen appealed from a district court judgment affirming a 
three-year revocation of her driver’s license for refusing to submit to an 
intoxilyzer test.92  Eriksmoen argued that she had been denied an “adequate 
opportunity to consult with her attorney” prior to refusing the intoxilyzer 
test.93  Under North Dakota law, a person arrested for driving under the 
influence has a “limited statutory right . . . to consult with counsel before 
deciding whether to submit to a chemical test.”94 
Highway Patrol Officer Troy Hischer noticed Eriksmoen’s car when 
the vehicle was in the right-turn-only lane with its right turn signal on, but 
turned left onto 32nd Avenue.95  After stopping the car, Hischer walked to 
the car, smelled the odor of alcohol on Eriksmoen’s breath, and noticed a 
case of beer in the car’s back seat.96  Eriksmoen admitted to drinking earlier 
at a wedding reception, so Hischer administered a field sobriety test on 
her.97  Upon failing the field sobriety test, Eriksmoen was read the implied 
consent advisory and asked to take the onsite screening test (SD-2 test) by 
giving a breath sample.98  She refused to provide a breath sample before 
speaking with her attorney.99  So Eriksmoen was arrested for driving-under-
the-influence (DUI) and escorted to the Grand Forks Police Department.100  
Upon arriving at the Grand Forks Police Department, Eriksmoen was 
 
90. Id. 
91. 2005 ND 206, 706 N.W.2d 610. 
92. Eriksmoen, ¶ 1, 706 N.W.2d at 611. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. ¶ 8, 706 N.W.2d at 612 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-05-20 (2005)). 
95. Id. ¶ 2, 706 N.W.2d at 611. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
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allowed to make a cellular phone call to her attorney’s son, and thereafter 
submitted a breath sample for the SD-2 test, failing this test as well.101 
While in the intoxilyzer room at the Grand Forks Police Department, 
Eriksmoen was again read the implied consent advisory and asked to take 
an intoxilyzer test.102  Before answering, she requested another phone call 
to her attorney, but this proved unnecessary because her attorney had al-
ready arrived at the police station.103 
Eriksmoen’s attorney, Henry Howe, requested a private room to meet 
with his client.104  However, Hischer was required to maintain supervision 
of Eriksmoen, and because no observational room was available at the time, 
Hischer offered to stand at the end of the intoxilyzer room and remain out 
of earshot.105  But Howe refused to consult with his client under such cir-
cumstances, as Hischer was standing a mere twenty-one feet away and did 
not prevent other officers from walking through the room.106  Howe left the 
station without advising Eriksmoen on whether to submit to the intoxilyzer 
test, so she refused to take the test.107 
A hearing officer found that Eriksmoen had not been deprived of her 
statutory right to consult counsel.108  A district judge affirmed.109 
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Eriksmoen’s main 
argument was that she was denied a reasonable opportunity to meet with 
her attorney in a meaningful way.110  In reviewing Eriksmoen’s claim, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court explained that deference must be given to the 
Department’s finding when evaluating a driver’s license suspension.111  The 
court had to determine “only whether a reasoning mind could have con-
cluded the Department’s findings were supported by the weight of the 
evidence from the entire record.”112  Therefore, the court would not reverse 
the agency’s findings unless: 
1. The order is not in accordance with the law. 
 
101. Id. 
102. Id.  ¶ 3, 706 N.W.2d at 611. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. ¶ 4. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. 
107. Id. ¶ 5. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 706 N.W.2d at 612. 
112. Id. ¶ 7 (citing Lee v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2004 ND 7, ¶ 9, 673 N.W.2d 245, 248). 
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2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the 
appellant. 
3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in 
the proceedings before the agency. 
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the 
appellant a fair hearing. 
5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not 
supported by its findings of fact. 
7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently 
address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant. 
8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not 
sufficiently explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting any 
contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an 
administrative law judge.113 
The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that an accused has only 
a “limited statutory right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to 
submit to a chemical test.”114  To determine whether Eriksmoen’s right to 
consult with counsel had been violated, the court relied on a balancing 
test.115  “[F]ailure to allow the arrested person a reasonable opportunity to 
contact an attorney prevents the revocation of her license for refusal to take 
the test.”116  The court explained that the reasonableness of the opportunity 
to meet with an attorney must be viewed objectively under the totality of 
the circumstances.117 
Relying on Bickler v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner,118 
Eriksmoen argued that she had a right to consult with her attorney in a 
private room.119  Eriksmoen asserted that a private room was necessary for 
attorney-client consultation so that she could speak with her attorney freely 
 
113. Id. ¶ 6 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46). 
114. Id. ¶ 8. 
115. Id. ¶ 9 (“The arrestee’s right to consult privately with counsel must be balanced against 
society’s strong interest in obtaining important evidence.” (quoting Wetzel v. N.D. Dep’t of 
Transp., 2001 ND 35, ¶ 12, 622 N.W.2d 180, 183)). 
116. Id. ¶ 9. 
117. Id. 
118. 423 N.W.2d 146 (N.D. 1988). 
119. Eriksmoen, ¶ 10, 706 N.W.2d at 612-13 (citing Bickler v. N.D. State Highway Comm’r, 
423 N.W.2d 146, 148 (N.D. 1988)). 
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and openly to prevent police from being within earshot.120  However, the 
court noted that Bickler did not require a private room for attorney-client 
discussions.121  Instead, Bickler stood for the proposition that “when an 
arrested person asks to consult with counsel before electing to take a 
chemical test he must be given the opportunity to do so out of police 
hearing, and law enforcement must establish that such opportunity was 
provided.”122  Therefore, Bickler required that police be out of earshot of 
the client-attorney discussion, not that a private room be provided.123 
Even though Bickler was factually similar, it did not support 
Eriksmoen’s argument.124  The court found that Eriksmoen was provided a 
room that, although not private, was reasonable and adequate for 
consultation with her attorney to discuss the legal situation prior to refusing 
the intoxilyzer test.125 In addition, the court noted that a specific room 
length was not a proper gauge for whether Eriksmoen had a reasonable 
opportunity to consult with her attorney.126  The court found that even if 
police officers had overheard her conversation with Howe, such testimony 
by the officers would have been inadmissible.127  Therefore, Eriksmoen’s 
attorney could have consulted with her regarding whether she should 
submit to the intoxilyzer test without such information being used against 
her.128  Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court affirmed the agency’s holding that Eriksmoen had a 
reasonable opportunity to consult with her attorney.129 
 
 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE—AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS BY CONSENT 
RUUD V. FRANDSON 
 
Dan Frandson appealed a declaratory judgment of the District Court of 
Ward County.130  The district court held that Frandson did not farm the 
cropland that he inherited under his mother’s will, which contained a clause 
 
120. Id. ¶ 12, 706 N.W.2d at 613. 
121. Id. ¶ 11. 
122. Id. (citing Bickler, 423 N.W.2d at 148). 
123. Id.  
124. Id. ¶ 12. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. ¶ 13. 
127. Id. ¶ 14. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Ruud v. Frandson, 2005 ND 174, ¶ 1, 704 N.W.2d 852, 854. 
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that provided an option for his sister, Karen Ruud, to purchase the land.131  
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.132 
Alice Frandson died testate in 1987, leaving in her will certain parcels 
of property to her son, Dan Frandson, with the following condition: 
In the event that Dan chooses not to farm any or all of the cropland 
during a twenty (20) year period following my death, then my 
daughters, together or separately, shall have the option to purchase 
any portion of that cropland at a price of $80.00 per acre through 
1991, and at one-third of its appraised value if purchased after 
1991, with all of the proceeds to go to my beloved son, Dan.133 
Upon his mother’s death, Frandson lived and worked on the cropland 
until 1991.134  In January 1991, Frandson left the farm and moved to Idaho, 
where he remained until returning to North Dakota in February of 1993.135  
When Frandson was away, he entered into a one-year crop share agreement 
with a third party for the years of 1991 and 1992.136  Upon Frandson’s 
return, he physically farmed the land until June of 1998.137  In 1998, 
Frandson and his wife attempted to secure an operating loan to update the 
farm machinery.138  When the loan was denied, Frandson entered into a 
crop-share agreement with his nephew, Jeffery Ruud, for the 1998 crop 
year.139  This lease was to run through the conclusion of the twenty-year 
clause in Alice Frandson’s will.140  The parties then entered into the lease, 
and Frandson sold much of the farm equipment to Jeffery Ruud.141  
Frandson moved back to Idaho.142 
On September 25, 2002, Karen Ruud hired an attorney to exercise her 
option to purchase the cropland based on the clause in the will.143  Frandson 
refused to recognize Karen Ruud’s efforts as a valid exercise of her option, 
and Karen Ruud commenced an action.144  The trial court found that the 
 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. ¶ 2. 
134. Id. ¶ 3. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. ¶ 4. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id.  
142. Id. 
143. Id. ¶ 5. 
144. Id. 
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mother’s intent was for Frandson to physically farm the land, and the court 
ordered Frandson to sell the cropland to Karen Ruud.145 
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Frandson argued that 
the trial court was clearly erroneous in its findings.146  In addition, Frandson 
argued that even though he did not raise the issue of waiver and estoppel in 
the pleadings, or amend the pleadings, these claims were impliedly tried 
through the introduction of evidence at trial.147 
Applying the “clearly erroneous” standard of review, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court noted that the mother intended Frandson to physically farm 
the land.148  Therefore, the court held that the trial court’s findings were not 
clearly erroneous.149 
Next, Frandson argued that Karen Ruud waived her rights through 
implied consent.150  Specifically, Frandson argued that Karen Ruud failed to 
notify him that he was not complying with the condition placed upon his 
ownership in the will.151  Because Karen Ruud failed to notify Frandson, he 
claimed that she waived her rights through implied consent.152  However, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court found that the issues of waiver and 
implied consent were not properly pled at trial.153 
For an effective appeal on a proper issue, the issue must have been 
raised at trial.154  If an issue is not pled, pleadings can be amended to 
conform to the evidence raised at trial.155  Under Rule 15(b) of the North 
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, “a pleading may be impliedly amended by 
the introduction of evidence which varies the theory of the case and which 
is not objected to on the grounds it is not within the issues in the plead-
ings.”156  But amendment by implication may only occur when the evidence 
that is introduced is not relevant to any issue in the case.157  When the 
 
145. Id. 
146. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Ruud v. Frandson, 2005 ND 174, 704 N.W.2d 852 (No. 
20050049). 
147. Frandson, ¶ 10, 704 N.W.2d at 855. 
148. Id.  ¶¶ 8-9, 704 N.W.2d at 855. 
149. Id. ¶ 9. 
150. Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 704 N.W.2d at 855-56. 
151. Id. ¶ 12, 704 N.W.2d at 856. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. ¶ 13, 704 N.W.2d at 857. 
154. Id. ¶ 10, 704 N.W.2d at 855. (citing Kautzman v. Kautzman, 2003 ND 140, ¶ 10, 668 
N.W.2d 59, 64). 
155. Id. (citing Tormaschy v. Tormaschy, 1997 ND 2, ¶ 17, 559 N.W.2d 813, 817). 
156. Id. (quoting Lochthowe v. C.F. Peterson Estate, 2005 ND 40, ¶ 8, 692 N.W.2d 120, 
123). 
157. Id. ¶ 10, 704 N.W.2d at 856. 
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evidence is relevant to an issue raised in the pleadings, then the pleadings 
may not be impliedly amended.158  Furthermore, the court has stated: 
When the evidence that is claimed to show that an issue was tried 
by consent is relevant to an issue already in the case, as well as to 
the one that is the subject matter of the amendment, and there was 
no indication at trial that the party who introduced the evidence 
was seeking to raise a new issue, the pleadings will not be deemed 
amended under the first portion of Rule 15(b).  The reasoning 
behind this view is sound since if evidence is introduced to support 
basic issues that already have been pleaded, the opposing party 
may not be conscious of its relevance to issues not raised by the 
pleadings unless that fact is specifically brought to his attention.159 
Frandson did not raise the issues of waiver and estoppel in the 
pleadings, nor in an amendment to the pleadings.160  Additionally, Frandson 
did not present any evidence during trial that would warn Karen Ruud that 
he intended to include waiver and estoppel, and instead he waited until his 
post-trial brief was filed to raise those issues.161  However, Frandson argued 
that his attorney’s questioning, regarding Karen Ruud’s failure to notify 
Frandson that he was violating the will’s stipulations, and Ruud’s involve-
ment in the lease negotiations between Frandson and Jeffrey Ruud were 
enough to bring waiver and estoppel arguments into the pleadings by 
implication.162 
Disagreeing with Frandson’s arguments, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court stated that Karen Ruud did not impliedly consent to a trial involving 
waiver and estoppel.163  The court found that although the lawyer’s 
questions relating to notice were relevant in determining if Frandson was 
complying with the will’s stipulations, such questions were not enough to 
put Karen Ruud on notice that he was expanding his claims to include 
waiver and estoppel.164  Additionally, the questions relating to the lease 
agreements were relevant only as to whether Frandson was farming the land 
in compliance with the will provision.165  But these questions did not notify 
Karen Ruud or the trial court that Frandson was expanding his theory to 
 
158. Id.  
159. Id. (quoting Mann v. Zabolotny, 2000 ND 160, ¶ 12, 615 N.W.2d 526, 529-30). 
160. Id. ¶ 11. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 704 N.W.2d at 856-57. 
163. Id. ¶13, 704 N.W.2d at 857. 
164. Id. ¶ 12. 
165. Id. ¶ 13. 
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include estoppel.166  Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that 
the lack of notification to Karen Ruud or the trial court regarding the 
expansion of Frandson’s case, to include theories of waiver and estoppel, 
did not allow for an amendment of the pleadings by consent.167 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE—DEFAULT JUDGMENT—DISCRETION OF THE COURT 
SCHWAN V. FOLDEN 
 
Following a trial on the merits, the district court entered a motion for 
default judgment against Paul Folden.168  Folden appealed the default judg-
ment entered against him.169  The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded for a judgment to be entered on the merits, rather than on 
judgment.170 
In North Dakota, the district court’s decision to grant a default 
judgment will be affirmed unless an abuse of discretion has occurred.171  A 
court abuses its discretion when it “acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or 
unconscionable manner, or when it misinterprets or misapplies the law.”172  
In determining whether the request for default judgment was proper, Rule 
55(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
If a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought 
has failed to plead or otherwise appear and the fact is made to 
appear by affidavit or otherwise, the court may direct the clerk to 
enter an appropriate judgment by default in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendant.173 
However, in countering Rule 55(a), the court noted that “if a plaintiff 
does not move for default judgment after the default has accrued or within a 
reasonable time after the default has accrued, and the answer is subse-
quently filed, then the plaintiff waives its right to default judgment for a 
defendant’s failure to appear.”174  The court continued by explaining that an 
 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Schwan v. Folden, 2006 ND 28, ¶ 1, 708 N.W.2d 863, 864. 
169. Id.  
170. Id. 
171. Id. ¶ 6, 708 N.W.2d at 865 (citing Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. v. Reikowski, 2005 
ND 133, ¶ 6, 699 N.W.2d 851, 853). 
172. Id. 
173. Id. ¶ 7 (quoting N.D.R.CIV.P. 55(a) (2005)). 
174. Id. (citing United Accounts, Inc. v. Lantz, 145 N.W.2d 488, 491 (N.D. 1966)). 
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entry of default judgment is a privilege the plaintiff may choose to apply.175  
The court took special notice of other jurisdictions holding that waiver of a 
default judgment will occur if the plaintiff proceeds to a trial on the merits 
without fully exercising its default judgment privileges.176 
In reversing the grant of Plaintiff Schwan’s motion for default 
judgment, the court reaffirmed its strong preference for cases to be decided 
on their merits.177  The court stated, “It is illogical to proceed with trial, 
hear evidence from each party, and expend judicial resources, only to 
decide the case with a default judgment.”178  Here, counsel for Schwan 
initially raised a motion for default judgment but proceeded to trial.179  
Because Schwan proceeded with trial, he presented evidence to the district 
court so that a decision could be made on the merits of the case.180  Conse-
quently, the court noted that Schwan extinguished his motion for a default 
judgment by proceeding to trial.181  Therefore, the court held that because 
Schwan could no longer invoke his privilege for default judgment, the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in failing to decide the case on its merits.182 
Before closing its opinion, the court stated that generally costs would 
be taxed to the appellee due to the reversal.183  However, because Folden’s 
counsel included items that were not in the record before the district court, 
it violated Rule 32 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure.184  
Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court denied payment of all costs by 
the appellee, Schwan.185 
 
 
175. Id. (citing 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 203 (1955) (explaining that the default judgment 
option may be waived by the plaintiff’s proceeding with the action, unless the plaintiff was 
ignorant of the default at the time). 
176. Id. ¶ 8 (citing Ewing v. Johnston, 334 S.E.2d 703, 707 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that 
“[f]acts which have been held to constitute waiver include . . . going to trial on the merits, or 
announcing ready for trial and introducing evidence on the merits.”); Johnson v. Gib’s W. 
Kitchen, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa 1983) (holding that “the court did not abuse its 
discretion in overruling plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment made during trial at the close of 
plaintiff’s case”); Kuykendall v. Circle, Inc., 539 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (finding 
that “Kuykendall, having proceeded to trial on the merits without confirming his preliminary 
default, waived his right to a default judgment”)). 
177. Id. ¶ 9 (citing Filler v. Bragg, 1997 ND 24, ¶ 14, 559 N.W.2d 225, 229). 
178. Id.  
179. Id. ¶ 10. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. ¶ 12 (citing N.D.R.APP.P. 39(a)(3) (2005)). 
184. Id. 
185. Id. ¶¶ 12-13 (citing N.D.R.APP.P. 13 (2005)).  Rule 13 of the North Dakota Rules of 
Appellate Procedure states that “the supreme court may take appropriate action against any person 
failing to perform an act required by rule or court order.”  N.D.R.APP.P. 13 (2005) 
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CRIMINAL LAW 
STATE V. BERTRAM 
 
In State v. Bertram,186 Randy Bertram appealed from a district court 
jury verdict finding him guilty of violating a disorderly conduct restraining 
order, criminal trespass, and contact by bodily fluids.  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court affirmed.187 
On January 16, 2004, a divorce decree between Joan and Randy 
Bertram awarded Joan the parties’ residence.188  On January 29, 2004, Joan 
obtained a temporary disorderly conduct restraining order against Randy.189  
On February 8, 2004, Randy entered Joan’s residence through a window 
and spoke with her in violation of the restraining order.190  In defense, 
Randy stated that he was attempting to retrieve his construction business’s 
tax records, which were located in the residence.191 
Randy was charged with a variety of offenses related to his actions of 
entering the home and violating the restraining order.192  While Randy was 
in custody, a correctional officer attempted to administer medication to 
Randy, and Randy responded by spitting on the officer.193  Because the 
officer was acting within the scope of his employment in administering 
medication to Randy, Randy was charged with contact by bodily fluids 
under section 12.1-17-11(1)(b)(3) of the North Dakota Century Code.194  In 
September 2004 and October 2004, Randy was convicted by a jury of 
violating a restraining order and contact by bodily fluids.195 
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Randy argued that the 
district court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal 
based on lack of evidence.196  Randy argued that the State failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was neither licensed nor privileged to 
 
186. 2006 ND 10, 708 N.W.2d 913. 
187. Bertram, ¶ 1, 708 N.W.2d at 917. 
188. Id. ¶ 2. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. ¶ 3 (explaining that the actual criminal violations were: (1) violating the disorderly 
conduct restraining order under North Dakota Century Code section 12.1-31.2-01; (2) for 
allegedly entering Joan’s home and speaking to her and with criminal trespass under North Dakota 
Century Code section 12.1-22-03(1) for allegedly entering her home, knowing he was not licensed 
or privileged to be in the home). 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. ¶ 4, 708 N.W.2d at 917-18. 
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enter the home.197  But the evidence showed that Randy was provided with 
the default divorce decree, which awarded Joan the parties’ home.198  In 
addition, Joan informed Randy that he was not allowed to enter the home 
unless she approved, so she changed the locks.199 
The court applied the standard set out in State v. Noorlun,200 to 
determine whether Randy’s conviction was based on sufficient evidence.201  
In Noorlun, the court stated, 
In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we look 
only to the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to 
the verdict to ascertain if there is substantial evidence to warrant 
the conviction.  A conviction rests upon insufficient evidence only 
when, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution and giving the prosecution the benefit of all 
inferences reasonably to be drawn in its favor, no rational fact 
finder could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.202 
Based on the trial court’s findings and the standard of review set out in 
Noorlun, the court found that “the evidence and reasonable inferences from 
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, are such that 
a rational fact finder could find Randy knew he was not licensed or 
privileged to enter Joan’s house.”203  Therefore, the conviction for criminal 
trespass was affirmed.204 
Randy’s second argument on appeal was that he was prosecuted 
simultaneously for the same offense when charged with criminal trespass 
and violation of the disorderly conduct restraining order.205  Randy claimed 
that such simultaneous prosecutions were in violation of his state and 
federal double jeopardy protections.206  In order to determine whether 
criminal trespass and violation of the disorderly conduct restraining order 
were the same offenses, the court applied the “same elements” test.207  The 
“same elements” test requires the court to determine “whether each offense 
 
197. Id. ¶ 8, 708 N.W.2d at 918. 
198. Id. ¶ 9. 
199. Id. ¶ 9, 708 N.W.2d at 918-19. 
200. 2005 ND 189, 705 N.W.2d 819. 
201. Bertram, ¶ 5, 708 N.W.2d at 918. 
202. Id. (quoting State v. Noorlun, 2005 ND 189, ¶ 20, 705 N.W.2d 819, 826-27). 
203. Id. ¶ 11, 708 N.W.2d at 919. 
204. Id. ¶ 12. 
205. Id. ¶ 13. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. ¶ 14. 
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contain[ed] an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same 
offense’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive 
prosecution.”208  Here, the criminal trespass charge required proof that 
Randy entered or remained in a dwelling knowing he was not licensed or 
privileged to be in that dwelling, and the disorderly conduct restraining 
order charge required an additional element of proof that Randy knew of the 
restraining order.209  Upon applying the “same elements” test, the court 
found that the two offenses contained different elements, and therefore, 
Randy’s double jeopardy protections were not violated.210 
Randy’s third argument on appeal was that the trial court failed to 
instruct the jury that “willful” culpability was required to prove a violation 
of the disorderly conduct restraining order.211  The court stated that in order 
for Randy to succeed on this argument, the district court’s jury instruction 
must have been in obvious error in “clear deviation from an applicable legal 
rule under current law.”212  But Randy did not object to this issue at trial.213  
Furthermore, the jury instructions included the essential elements of the 
offense based on section 12.1-31.2-01(8) of the North Dakota Century 
Code.214  Therefore, the court rejected Randy’s argument and concluded 
that the district court’s jury instruction on the violation of the disorderly 
conduct restraining order was not in error.215 
Randy also argued that reversal is required because the state failed to 
allege all of the essential elements of contact by bodily fluids in the 
amended documents.216  In the amended documents, the state failed to 
include the words, “unless the employee does an act within the scope of 
employment which requires or causes the contact.”217  Consequently, the 
court has held that an information must be a written statement that contains 
the essential elements of the offense.218  Furthermore, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court relied on State v. Franfurth,219 which stated that “elements 
of an offense” means: “(1) the forbidden conduct, (2) the attendant 
circumstances specified in the definition and grading of the offense, (3) the 
 
208. Id. (quoting City of Fargo v. Hector, 534 N.W.2d 821, 823 (N.D. 1995)). 
209. Id. ¶ 15, 708 N.W.2d at 920. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. ¶ 16. 
212. Id. ¶ 17 (quoting State v. Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 14, 575 N.W.2d 658, 663). 
213. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. 
214. Id. ¶¶ 17-20. 
215. Id. ¶ 20. 
216. Id. ¶ 21, 708 N.W.2d at 921. 
217. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-11(1)(b) (2005)). 
218. Id. ¶ 23 (citing State v. Frankfurth, 2005 ND 167, ¶ 7, 704 N.W.2d 564, 566. 
219. 2005 ND 167, 704 N.W.2d 564. 
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required culpability, (4) any required result, and (5) the nonexistence of a 
defense as to which there is evidence sufficient to give rise to a reasonable 
doubt on the issue.”220 
Additionally, the court stated that technical defects would be dismissed 
if the defendant had sufficient notice to prepare his defense.221  Here, the 
applicable statute allowed for liability of bodily fluids when the victim 
(officer) of the contact of bodily fluids was “acting in the scope of 
employment,” but if the victim (officer) was acting “within the scope of 
employment,” then the victim (officer) was precluded recovery.222  There-
fore, Randy contended that if his bodily fluids came into contact with the 
correctional officer, then it was a result of the officer acting in the course of 
his employment.223  But the court found that Deputy Anderson, the victim, 
was administering medication when Randy spit on him.224  Thus, the court 
stated that the omission of the language “in” or “within” was not a technical 
defect, and therefore, Randy’s defense was negated.225 
The court refused to expand Frankfurth beyond the factual circum-
stances of that case.226  While in Frankfurth, the defendant claimed that the 
information failed to allege his “knowledge” of the crime and he did not 
raise this defense until post-trial, Randy did not wait until post-trial to raise 
his defense as to the wording in the charging document, and instead raised 
it during the trial.227 Therefore, instead of applying Frankfurth, the court 
applied the “harmless error” analysis.228  Because there was a lack of evi-
dence to support Randy’s assertion that he relied on the charging document 
to his detriment, the court determined that the defect in the charging 
document was harmless.229 
Randy’s appeal included arguments of reversible errors because of 
prosecutorial misstatements, a failure of the district court to inform counsel 
in writing of a jury instruction, and ineffective assistance of counsel.230  The 
court quickly dismissed these arguments on grounds that Randy’s 
 
220. Bertram,  ¶ 23, 708 N.W.2d at 922 (citing Frankfurth, ¶ 6, 704 N.W.2d at 566). 
221. Id. 
222. Id. ¶ 27, 708 N.W.2d at 923 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-11(1)(a)-(b) (2005)) 
(emphasis added). 
223. Id. ¶ 28. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. ¶ 29. 
227. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. 
228. Id. ¶¶ 30-31, 708 N.W.2d at 923-24 (providing the relevant text of rule 52(a) of the 
N.D.R.CRIM.P., “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded”). 
229. Id. ¶ 32, 708 N.W.2d at 924. 
230. Id. ¶¶ 33-41, 708 N.W.2d at 924-26 
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substantial rights were not affected, and therefore, his claims were 
unsubstantiated.231 
In conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court denied all of Randy’s 
arguments on appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.232 
 
CRIMINAL LAW—PLEAS 
STATE V. FEIST 
 
In State v. Feist,233 Douglas Feist appealed from a criminal judgment 
that was entered after he pled guilty to possession of a pipe bomb.234  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the conviction because: (1) the 
district court failed to comply with Rule 11(c) of the North Dakota Rules of 
Civil Procedure; and (2) the record demonstrated a lack of understanding 
over what type of plea agreement existed.235 
Andrew Greff and Feist decided to make a bomb and detonate it south 
of Bismarck.236  When the bomb failed to detonate, Feist convinced Greff to 
leave the bomb at the site.237  Greff took Feist home and then went back to 
the site.238  Greff ignited the bomb, and the explosion severed his arm, 
which was later amputated.239  Feist was arrested when the receipts for the 
materials of the pipe bomb connected him to its construction.240 
On August 18, 2004, Feist pled guilty to the charge of possession of a 
pipe bomb.241  When the district court judge asked him for his plea, the 
court failed to ask if a plea agreement existed.242  At a March 22, 2005, 
sentencing hearing, Feist contended that he had entered a plea agreement 
with the State’s Attorney, who was unable to attend court that day.243  On 
March 30, 2005, after dealing with an unrelated matter regarding another 
offense by Feist, the court inquired as to the existence of a plea agree-
ment.244  After some discussion, the State’s Attorney requested a sentence 
 
231. Id. ¶¶ 41-43, 708 N.W.2d at 926. 
232. Id. ¶ 43. 
233. 2006 ND 21, 708 N.W.2d 870. 
234. Feist, ¶ 1, 708 N.W.2d at 872 (explaining that this is an illegal act under North Dakota 
Century Code section 62.1-05-01). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. ¶ 2. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. ¶ 3. 
240. Id. ¶ 4. 
241. Id. ¶ 5. 
242. Id. ¶ 6. 
243. Id. ¶ 7, 708 N.W.2d at 872-73. 
244. Id. ¶ 9, 708 N.W.2d at 873. 
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of two years, with all but six months suspended.245  The district court 
rejected the plea agreement, and Feist requested a jury trial.246 
On April 13, 2005, a written order was issued stating the circumstances 
and the confusion regarding the plea agreement.247  The written order stated 
that the parties originally denied the existence of a plea agreement on the 
issue of Feist’s possession of a pipe bomb and later agreed that an agree-
ment did exist.248 
On May 2, 2005, the State’s Attorney denied any existence of a plea 
agreement, while Feist requested a withdrawal of his guilty plea.249  The 
judge denied Feist’s motion and sentenced him to five years, while his co-
defendant, the one who actually ignited the bomb, was sentenced to six 
months.250 
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Feist argued that the 
district court must withdraw his guilty plea due to the existence of his 
binding plea agreement with the State’s Attorney.251  However, the State 
argued that no binding plea existed, and instead, the State asserted that the 
parties agreed to a non-binding sentencing recommendation.252  Further-
more, the State argued that if a plea agreement had existed, it would have 
been stated when Feist first admitted guilt.253 
Under State v. Thompson,254 if the parties agree to a non-binding 
recommendation, the State’s obligation is fulfilled when it presents that 
recommendation to the court.255  Furthermore, Thompson stood for the 
proposition that the court may impose a harsher sentence than recom-
mended by the State without allowing the defendant to withdraw a guilty 
plea.256  Therefore, when a court is presented with a binding plea agree-
ment, the court can accept the agreement, reject the agreement, or defer its 
decision until receiving a pre-sentence report.257 
 
245. Id. ¶ 10, 708 N.W.2d at 873-74. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. ¶ 11, 708 N.W.2d at 874 
248. Id. 
249. Id. ¶ 12. 
250. Id. ¶ 13. 
251. Id. ¶ 14. 
252. Id. ¶ 15, 708 N.W.2d at 874-75. 
253. Id. 
254. 504 N.W.2d 315 (N.D. 1993). 
255. Feist, ¶ 16, 708 N.W.2d at 875 (citing State v. Thompson, 504 N.W.2d 315, 319 (N.D. 
1993)). 
256. Id. (citing Thompson, 504 N.W.2d at 319). 
257. Id. (citing N.D.R.CRIM.P. 11(d)(2) (2002). 
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Here, the record was unclear as to whether a plea agreement existed on 
Feist’s charge of possession of a pipe bomb.258  The confusion was illus-
trated by: (1) contradictory statements made by the State’s Attorney; and 
(2) the district court judge instructing the parties that he rejected the plea 
agreement.259  The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that when plea 
agreements are ambiguous, a trial court should clarify the problem on the 
record.260  In this case, the trial court did not attempt to determine the true 
nature of the agreement on the record, so the supreme court had to deter-
mine whether the withdrawal of the guilty plea was necessary to prevent 
injustice.261 
A court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea at any time if 
the defendant can prove that the withdrawal is necessary to prevent mani-
fest injustice.262  The determination of whether a manifest injustice has 
occurred is left to the district court to decide and will be reversed only on 
appeal in abuse of discretion.263  Historically, the court has stated that Rule 
32(d) of the North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure should be “liberally 
construed in favor of the defendant and that leave to withdraw a guilty plea 
before sentencing should be freely granted.”264  Abuses of discretion occur 
when a court acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious manner or 
misinterprets or misapplies the law.265  Additionally, Rule 11(c) of the 
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a court advise a 
defendant of certain rights before accepting a guilty plea.266 
Here, the district court failed to clear up confusion as to whether a plea 
agreement existed on Feist’s charge of possession of a pipe bomb.267  Be-
cause the court failed to inquire into the parties’ discussions as to whether a 
plea agreement existed, it failed to comply with Rule 11(c).268  As a result, 
the record was ambiguous as to whether a binding plea agreement existed, 
so the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to 
allow Feist to withdraw his guilty plea.269 
 
258. Id. ¶ 17. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. ¶ 18 (citing Peltier v. State, 2003 ND 27, ¶ 12 n.1, 657 N.W.2d 238, 242). 
261. Id. ¶ 19, 708 N.W.2d at 875-76. 
262. Id. ¶ 20, 708 N.W.2d at 876 (citing N.D.R.CRIM.P. 32(d)(1) (2002)). 
263. Id. ¶ 22 (citing State v. Sisson, 1997 ND 158, ¶15, 567 N.W.2d 839, 843). 
264. Id. ¶ 21 (quoting State v. Millner, 409 N.W.2d 642, 644 (N.D. 1987)). 
265. Id. (citing State v. Farrell, 2000 ND 26, ¶ 8, 606 N.W.2d 524, 528). 
266. Id. ¶ 24, 708 N.W.2d at 876-77 (citing N.D.R.CRIM.P. 11(c) which provides that a court 
is required to determine if a defendant’s guilty plea is fully understood by the defendant).  
267. Id. ¶ 25, 708 N.W.2d at 877. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. ¶ 28. 
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FAMILY LAW—CHILD CUSTODY—DISCRETION OF THE COURT 
L.C.V. V. D.E.G. 
 
In L.C.V. v. D.E.G.,270 L.C.V. (hereinafter “Lisa”) appealed from a 
district court judgment, which found that D.E.G. (hereinafter “Doug”) was 
the biological father of their child (“Ann”) and granted custody and child 
support to Doug.271  Lisa argued that the court’s grant of custody was 
arbitrary and clearly erroneous.272  In addition, Lisa asserted that she should 
have been awarded attorney fees and retroactive child support for the period 
during which she was the primary caregiver of Ann.273 
On June 18, 2003, Lisa filed a paternity action against Doug for child 
support because they were not married.274  After admitting to being Ann’s 
father, Doug requested that the court grant him custody and child support 
from Lisa.275  The court awarded Doug primary physical custody of Ann 
and child support, but permitted liberal visitations for Lisa.276  Lisa re-
quested retroactive child support for the time when she was Ann’s primary 
caretaker, but the court declined her request.277  No attorneys’ fees were 
granted for either party.278 
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court assessed the grant of 
custody under a limited scope of review, attempting only to determine if the 
district court acted in the best interests and welfare of the child.279  The 
supreme court evaluated the district court’s findings on a clearly erroneous 
standard.280  If the district court’s rationale is supported by sufficient 
specificity, then its award of custody has to be upheld.281 
First, Lisa claimed that the district court had acted arbitrarily by 
granting physical custody to Doug.282  Previously, the parties had agreed to 
the appointment of a custody investigator, who submitted a final report 
 
270. 2005 ND 180, 705 N.W.2d 257. 
271. L.C.V., ¶ 1, 705 N.W.2d at 259. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. ¶ 2. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. ¶ 3, 705 N.W.2d at 259 (citing In re Griffey, 2002 ND 160, ¶ 5, 652 N.W.2d 351, 
353).  The North Dakota Century Code provides a list of factors the court must consider in 
awarding custody.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) (2004)). 
280. Id. 
281. Id.  (citing Schmidt v. Schmidt, 2003 ND 55, ¶ 6, 660 N.W.2d 196, 199). 
282. Id. ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 259-60. 
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stating the parties should share custody on a schedule that would leave Lisa 
as the primary physical custodian.283  The district court did not follow the 
suggestion of the investigator, but did consider the report when making its 
decision.284  The supreme court determined that the district court’s decision 
to grant custody to Doug was not arbitrary because the investigator’s report 
had been considered when making the decision.285 
Next, Lisa claimed that two findings of fact made by the district court 
were clearly erroneous.286  Lisa first contested the district court’s finding 
that her testimony, regarding the amount of time that Doug spent with Ann, 
was not credible based on the investigator’s report.287  Likewise, Lisa 
contended the district court’s finding that Doug provided a more stable and 
satisfactory environment for Ann was clearly erroneous.288  But the district 
court made specific findings that Lisa had carried on various impermanent 
romantic relationships, while Doug separated Ann from his outside 
relationships.289  In addition, Doug separately testified that Ann was having 
difficulty leaving him after their visits.290  Based on this information and 
the investigator’s report, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that 
the district court remained within its discretion and did not make clearly 
erroneous findings of fact.291 
The supreme court then reviewed the district court’s considerations for 
awarding Doug physical custody of Ann.292  The district court made the 
following findings: 
[T]hat both parents have strong emotional ties to Ann but Doug is 
best able to provide love and affection to Ann, because Lisa has 
demonstrated stronger ties to her two older children from a prior 
relationship and a lesser regard . . . for her relationship with 
Ann . . . Doug has the capacity and disposition to best provide 
guidance and education for Ann . . . [B]oth parents have the ability 
to provide for Ann’s material needs, but Doug can provide a more 
stable positive home environment for her . . . [B]oth parents are fit 
 
283. Id. 
284. Id. ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 260. 
285. Id. (citing Hogan v. Hogan, 2003 ND 105, ¶ 10, 665 N.W.2d 672, 676 (explaining that 
the court “cannot delegate to . . . an independent investigator its authority to award custody to the 
parent who will promote the best interests and welfare of the child”)). 
286. Id. ¶ 5. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(d) (2004)). 
289. Id. 
290. Id. ¶ 6, 705 N.W.2d at 261. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. ¶ 8, 705 N.W.2d at 262 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) (2004)). 
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to provide for Ann’s care, but Doug is overall the better choice to 
have primary physical custody of Ann.293 
Because the district court made the proper statutory considerations, 
supported by the evidence, the supreme court would not substitute its own 
judgment for the district court’s findings.294  The supreme court held the 
“district court’s decision to award primary physical custody to Doug, with 
liberal visitation privileges for Lisa, is supported by the record evidence and 
is not clearly erroneous.”295 
Next, Lisa claimed the district court’s failure to award her retroactive 
child support as Ann’s primary caretaker was reversible error.296  Lisa 
argued that the district court did not make any findings regarding her 
request for retroactive child support.297  The supreme court determined that 
the district court failed to make the necessary findings regarding child 
support guidelines established by the Department of Human Services.298  
The supreme court thus remanded the issue of retroactive child support for 
additional findings of fact and redetermination.299 
Finally, Lisa claimed that the district court’s failure to award her 
attorney fees was reversible error.300  The supreme court disagreed with this 
argument, finding that without either an agreement between the parties or a 
statutory basis, attorney fees were improper.301  Thus, the supreme court 
held that since there was no agreement in place, no statute to rely on, and no 
argument that Doug made frivolous claims, Lisa’s claim for attorney fees 
failed.302 
The North Dakota Supreme Court granted Lisa’s appeal for recon-
sideration of retroactive child support and affirmed all other findings of the 
district court.303 
 
 
 
293. Id. 
294. Id. ¶ 9 (citing Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 2005 ND 131, ¶ 12, 700 N.W.2d 711, 717). 
295. Id. 
296. Id. ¶ 10. 
297. Id. ¶ 11. 
298. Id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 705 N.W.2d at 262-63 (citing T.E.J. v. T.S., 2004 ND 120, ¶ 4, 681 
N.W.2d 444, 446). 
299. Id. ¶ 11, 705 N.W.2d at 263 (citing Lukenbill v. Fettig, 2001 ND 47, ¶ 9, 623 N.W.2d 7, 
10 (stating that “where the court does not clearly set forth how its child support decision is in 
compliance with the child support guidelines, or why it has decided to deviate therefrom, it is 
appropriate to remand for additional findings and a redetermination of the issue”)). 
300. Id. ¶ 12. 
301. Id. ¶ 14 (citing Lukenbill, ¶ 14, 623 N.W.2d at 11). 
302. Id. ¶ 14, 705 N.W.2d at 264 (citing Lukenbill,  ¶ 15, 623 N.W.2d at 11). 
303. Id. ¶ 15. 
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FAMILY LAW–CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES–STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
SIMON V. SIMON 
 
In Simon v. Simon,304 the Foster County Social Service Board, on 
behalf of the State of North Dakota, appealed the district court’s interpre-
tation of offset provisions “of the split custody and equal custody regula-
tions of the child support guidelines.”305  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court’s interpretation, “concluding [that] the offset pro-
visions apply to all split custody and equal custody cases, including those 
where one parent assigns the right to receive child support to the State.”306 
Because the parents shared equal and split custody of their children, at 
issue was the district court’s interpretation of sections 75-02-04.1-03 and 
75-02-04.1-08.2 of the North Dakota Administrative Code.307  Particularly, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court had to determine whether to offset child 
support where one parent had assigned the right to receive support to the 
State.308  The State argued that the offset provisions of those sections were 
not applicable when one parent had assigned the right to receive child 
support to the State.309  Because the language of the sections was ambig-
uous, the State argued that deference should be given to the Child Support 
Guidelines Drafting Committee’s (hereinafter “the Committee”) interpre-
tation.310  Pursuant to section 75-02-04.1-03 of the North Dakota Adminis-
trative Code, once a district court has ordered split custody, each parent’s 
child support obligation is determined, and the parent with the greater child 
support obligation should pay the difference between the obligations to the 
lesser obligated parent as offset.311  The court noted that section 75-02-
04.1-03 did not include an exception where the State had been assigned the 
right to receive support.312 
To determine the validity of the State’s arguments, the supreme court 
reviewed the Committee’s recommendations prior to the 2003 amendment 
of section 75-02-04.1-03 of the North Dakota Administrative Code.313  At 
that time, the Committee had considered an exception to the offset pro-
vision where one parent’s right to receive child support was assigned to a 
 
304. 2006 ND 29, 709 N.W.2d 4. 
305. Simon, ¶ 1, 709 N.W.2d at 6. 
306. Id.  
307. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9. 
308. Id. 
309. Id. ¶ 9. 
310. Id. ¶ 19. 
311. Id. ¶ 13 (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-03 (2005)). 
312. Id. ¶ 13. 
313. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. 
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“governmental entity.”314  However, these recommendations were never 
implemented because the Committee anticipated difficulties “when the 
offset is not applied, including the fluctuating monthly amounts of child 
support the parents would pay, how parents would receive notice of the 
change in the monthly payment, and the consequences when one parent 
could not pay his or her obligation.”315  But because the Committee had not 
rejected language that permitted a party to assign the right to receive 
support, the offset provision in section 75-02-04.1-03 encompassed 
assignments.316 
Therefore, the State’s argument, based on the North Dakota Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of section 75-02-04.1-03 of the North Dakota 
Administrative Code failed.  Despite an assignment of rights to the State, 
there is no provision in the statute or its legislative history for deference to 
be paid to the Committee’s reasonable interpretation of the statute, which 
would require the offset provision to be set aside.317  The court affirmed the 
district court’s interpretation of section 75-02-04.1-03.318 
To determine the child support obligation of each parent where the 
parents hold equal custody, the court evaluated section 75-02-04.1-08.2 of 
the North Dakota Administrative Code.319  The statute provides: 
A child support obligation must be determined as described in this 
section in all cases in which a court orders each parent to have 
equal physical custody of their child or children.  Equal physical 
custody means each parent has physical custody of the child, or if 
there are multiple children, all of the children, exactly fifty percent 
of the time.  A child support obligation for each parent must be 
calculated under this chapter assuming the other parent is the 
custodial parent of the child or children subject to the equal 
physical custody order.  The lesser obligation is then subtracted 
from the greater.  The difference is the child support amount owed 
by the parent with the greater obligation.  Each parent is an obligee 
 
314. Id. ¶ 16 (citing Minutes of the Department of Human Services Child Support Guidelines 
Drafting Advisory Committee 15 (May 29, 2002)). 
315. Id. ¶ 16 (citing Minutes of the Department of Human Services Child Support Guidelines 
Drafting Advisory Committee 3-4 (June 6, 2002)). 
316. Id. ¶ 17 (citing Little v. Tracy, 497 N.W.2d 700, 705 (N.D. 1993)). 
317. Id. ¶¶ 19-20, 709 N.W.2d at 10 (citing State ex rel. Clayburgh v. American West Cmty. 
Promotions, Inc., 2002 ND 98, ¶¶ 7-9, 645 N.W.2d 196, 200-02) (stating that “[a]n administrative 
agency’s interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference if the statute is complex and technical 
in nature, or if the statute is reenacted after a contemporaneous and continuous construction of the 
statute by the administrative agency”).  The court explained that because neither of these 
conditions existed in Simon v. Simon, less weight need be given to the agency.  Id. 
318. Id. ¶ 20. 
319. Id. ¶ 21. 
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to the extent of the other parent’s calculated obligation.  Each 
parent is an obligor to the extent of that parent’s calculated 
obligation.320 
When interpreting section 75-02-04.1-08.2 of the Administrative Code, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court relied on the Committee’s guidance.321  
The court rejected the State’s argument that an offset exception should be 
triggered when the State is assigned the right to receive child support 
payments, specifically noting that section 75-02-04.1-08.2 had been drafted 
with section 75-02-04.1-03 in mind.322  Because the offset provision in 
section 75-02-04.1-08.2 was based on the same provision in 75-02-04.1-03, 
with the goal of having consistent application, the court held that no 
exception existed for the State to set aside offset where it was assigned the 
rights to receive child support payments.323 
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s 
interpretation of the North Dakota Administrative Code.324 
 
FAMILY LAW—EQUITABLE-OFFSET REMEDY 
HEWSON V. HEWSON 
 
In Hewson v. Hewson,325 Leon Hewson appealed from the trial court’s 
amended judgment, which ordered that he pay Joselyn Privratsky (formerly 
“Joselyn Hewson”) $17,852 to correct an unequal asset distribution 
resulting from the parties’ divorce.326  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded, based upon the trial court’s failure to make specific 
findings as to the determination of the $17,852 figure and if the amount of 
credit for child support that Privratsky may have owed Hewson was 
included in that figure.327 
The Hewsons divorced in July of 1991.328  Under the terms of their 
divorce decree, Hewson received custody of their children.329  Both parties 
entered into a property settlement agreement that was incorporated into the 
 
320. Id. ¶ 21 (quoting N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-08.2 (2005)). 
321. Id. ¶ 22. 
322. Id. ¶ 22 (citing Minutes of the Department of Human Services Child Support Guidelines 
Drafting Advisory Committee 6 (June 11, 2002)). 
323. Id. ¶ 22. 
324. Id. ¶ 23, 709 N.W.2d at 11. 
325. 2006 ND 16, 708 N.W.2d 889. 
326. Hewson, ¶ 1, 708 N.W.2d at 891. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. ¶ 2. 
329. Id. 
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divorce judgment.330  The property settlement stated that Hewson would 
retain the majority of the marital assets as an offset to receiving child 
support from Privratsky because Privratsky could not afford to pay more 
than $10 per child in monthly child support.331  Therefore, by accepting the 
settlement agreement, Hewson was not able to receive child support from 
Privratsky.332  The divorce judgment stated that the agreement was a con-
tract that could not be modified by either the parties or the court, and 
Hewson agreed to indemnify Privratsky and hold her harmless for any 
future child support claims.333 
In 1995, Hewson commenced an action through Southwest Area Child 
Support Enforcement Unit (hereinafter “SACSEU”), whereby Privratsky 
agreed to pay a monthly amount of $126 per child in child support, which 
was incorporated into an amended judgment.334  In 2003, Hewson requested 
another review of Privratsky’s child support obligation.335  The SACSEU 
moved to increase her obligation, to which Privratsky argued that she had 
given up all marital property in lieu of child support.336  Upon holding a 
hearing on February 3, 2004, the trial court ordered that the amount of 
forfeited property be calculated and deducted from the amount of child 
support owed since 1991, the year that the parties divorced.337 
In May 2004, the trial court ordered that custody of the children be 
transferred to Privratsky.338  In addition, the court ordered Hewson to pay 
$1,146 in monthly child support and terminated Privratsky’s support 
obligation.339 
In January 2005, the trial court found that Privratsky had paid a total of 
$12,852 in child support to Hewson since their divorce.340  The court stated: 
I have a strong feeling that after land valuation, credits and debits, 
due consideration for what everyone should and could have paid 
and done, that the bottom of the tape would show that Leon owes 
Joselyn around $18,000. 
. . . . 
 
330. Id. 
331. Id. 
332. Id. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. ¶ 3. 
335. Id. 
336. Id. 
337. Id. ¶ 3, 708 N.W.2d at 892. 
338. Id. ¶ 4. 
339. Id. 
340. Id. ¶ 5. 
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So from the disproportionate property division, Leon still owes 
Joselyn $17,852 which, by great co-incidence [sic], comes very 
close to the amount that Joselyn paid directly in child support plus 
about $5,000 in attorney’s fees.341 
On April 26, 2005, the trial court ordered Hewson to pay Privratsky 
$17,852 to correct the unequal asset distribution that resulted from the 
divorce.342 
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Hewson raised two 
issues, whether: (1) the trial court erred when it applied the equitable-offset 
remedy to offset the amount of marital property that Privratsky gave up 
against her child support obligation; and (2) the trial court erred in its 
finding that the amount of the equitable offset was $17,852.343  Hewson 
argued that the trial court erred by failing to state how it arrived at the 
$17,852 figure.344  But Privratsky disagreed and stated that there was 
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order.345 
First, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the trial court could 
only modify the parties’ child support obligation, and not their property 
settlement, in an amended judgment.346  The supreme court has maintained 
a longstanding principle that “a trial court ‘does not have continuing juris-
diction to modify a property distribution in a divorce judgment, but has 
continuing jurisdiction to modify child support.’”347 
Next, the court evaluated whether the trial court erred when it applied 
the equitable-offset remedy to Privratsky’s marital property for her child 
support obligation.348  Using a de novo standard of review, the court 
reviewed the divorce decree, specifically the child support obligations.349  
Notably, the court stated that a child support agreement should be accepted 
by a trial court only if the agreement represented the best interests of the 
child.350 
In Rueckert v. Rueckert,351 the North Dakota Supreme Court deter-
mined that a clause in a divorce decree that limited the court’s power to 
 
341. Id. 
342. Id. 
343. Id. ¶ 6. 
344. Id. 
345. Id. 
346. Id. ¶ 7. 
347. Id. 
348. Id. ¶ 11. 
349. Id. ¶ 8. 
350. Id. ¶ 9 (citing Rueckert v. Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d 863, 868 (N.D. 1993)). 
351. 499 N.W.2d 863 (N.D. 1993). 
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modify child support agreements was void as against public policy.352  
Additionally, the court found that when a parent foregoes property rights in 
marital assets in order to waive paying future child support, that parent 
could offset the value of the assets from the amount of the child support 
obligation.353  The court noted that this remedy was not intended to super-
cede a child’s right to receive support from both parents, but rather was 
intended to grant parents credit for property settlements.354  Furthermore, 
the court noted that the result of offsetting child support with marital 
property was that it placed responsibility for the support of their children on 
both parents.355  In addition, the court stated in Rueckert that the forfeiture 
of property would only be a prepayment of child support when equity 
demanded it and the child’s right to support was not superseded.356 
Here, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that the trial court’s use 
of the equitable-offset remedy was appropriate.357  The court found that the 
equitable-offset remedy would not adversely affect the support to the 
parties’ children because Hewson’s custody rights had been terminated and 
transferred to Privratsky and one of the children was no longer a minor.358 
Next, the North Dakota Supreme Court evaluated whether the trial 
court erred when finding that the amount of equitable-offset was 
$17,852.359  Relying on Dufner v. Dufner,360 “[a]s a matter of law, a trial 
court must clearly set forth how it arrived at the amount of income and level 
of support.”361  Here, the trial court determined the $17,852 offset figure on 
merely a “strong feeling,” rather than making a specific finding on the 
record.362  Therefore, the determination by the trial court fell below the 
standard set forth in Dufner.363  Since the trial court made no clear determi-
nation as to its calculation of the $17,852 offset figure, the supreme court 
could not determine whether Privratsky owed child support to Hewson or 
whether she was entitled to future credit for paying too much in child 
support.364 
 
352. Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d at 868. 
353. Id. at 870-71. 
354. Hewson, ¶ 11, 708 N.W.2d at 893. 
355. Id. 
356. Id. 
357. Id. ¶ 12. 
358. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. 
359. Id. ¶ 14, 708 N.W.2d at 894.  360. 2002 N.D. 47, 640 N.W.2d 694. 
361. Hewson, ¶ 14, 708 N.W.2d at 894 (quoting Dufner, ¶ 22, 640 N.W.2d at 701). 
362. Id. 
363. Id. 
364. Id. 
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The North Dakota Supreme Court ordered the trial court to use the 
framework set forth in Rueckert to make specific findings of fact as to the 
values and offset amounts that Privratsky should be credited from the time 
of entry in the original divorce decree to the first order establishing child 
support in July of 1995.365  In order to do this, the trial court must evaluate 
Privratsky’s gross income and the guidelines during that time frame.366  
Then, the trial court was ordered to calculate the amount of child support 
Privratsky owed from July 20, 1995, the date of the amended judgment, to 
July 2, 2003, the day before the SACSEU made a motion to increase 
support.367  Because a court cannot retroactively modify unpaid child sup-
port, the trial court must reinstate the $126 in monthly child support per 
child that was ordered on July 20, 1995.368  Then, the trial court must 
calculate the amount of child support owed under guidelines effective July 
2, 2003, through April 20, 2004 (the day before custody of the children 
changed hands from one parent to the other).369  Once the total amount of 
child support due is determined, the court must subtract the amount 
Privratsky has paid from the total owed.370  Finally, the total amount unpaid 
must be offset by the value of the property Privratsky relinquished in the 
divorce decree.371  Upon this calculation, if there was credit in favor of 
Privratsky, then this credited amount would be owed to Hewson if custody 
changed hands to Hewson.372 
In conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded 
for further proceedings. 373 
 
FAMILY LAW—TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS—STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
IN RE IN THE INTEREST OF M.B. AND N.B. V. I.B. 
 
I.B., father of M.B. and N.B., appealed the juvenile court’s orders, 
which ended his rights as a parent and denied his motion for continued 
 
365. Id. ¶15. 
366. Id. 
367. Id. (citing Geinert v. Geinert, 2002 ND 135, ¶ 10, 649 N.W.2d 237, 241 (“[A] 
modification of child support generally should be made effective from the date of the motion to 
modify, absent good reason to set some other date.  The trial court retains discretion to set some 
later effective date, but its reasons for doing so should be apparent or explained.”)). 
368. Id.; see Rueckert v. Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d 863, 870 n.4 (N.D. 1993) (stating that a court 
may not retroactively modify unpaid child support). 
369. Id. 
370. Id. 
371. Id. 
372. Id. ¶ 16. 
373. Id. ¶ 17. 
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visitation.374  The trial court determined that I.B. was aware of the pro-
ceedings he faced and the evidence supported terminating I.B.’s parental 
rights.375  The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s 
findings.376 
I.B. and K.S. had two children prior to marrying in 2000, and four 
years later they divorced.377  Each child had been diagnosed with attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defiant disorder.378  Because 
the parents had exposed the children to domestic violence in the home, 
sexual activity, and pornographic and horror films, the juvenile court found 
the children were deprived and placed them in the custody of social services 
in April 2002.379  The children remained in the custody of social services 
only intermittently, though, because the juvenile court allowed the children 
to reunify with their parents in the summer of 2002.380  In July 2004, social 
worker Marlene Sorum petitioned the court to terminate the parental rights 
of I.B. and K.S.381  The children’s mother, K.S., consented to having her 
parental rights terminated; however, the children’s father, I.B., “appeared to 
defend against the petition,” arguing that he wished to provide for M.B. and 
N.B.382  Although the children’s guardian ad litem proposed a reunification 
with the father, a judicial referee found the kids deprived after a three-day 
trial and ordered the termination of I.B.’s parental rights.383  Sorum 
prepared the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, which were all 
adopted in full.384   
Following I.B.’s request for judicial review of his terminated parental 
and visitation rights, the district judge affirmed.385  The North Dakota 
Century Code requires that a petition to terminate parental rights set out 
plainly:  
[t]he facts which bring the child within the jurisdiction of the 
court, with a statement that it is in the best interest of the child and 
the public that the proceeding be brought and, if delinquency or 
 
374. In re Interest of M.B. and N.B. v. I.B., 2006 ND 19, ¶ 1, 709 N.W.2d 11, 14. 
375. Id.  
376. Id. 
377. Id. ¶ 2. 
378. Id. 
379. Id. 
380. Id. 
381. Id. ¶ 3. 
382. Id. 
383. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. 
384. Id. ¶ 4. 
385. Id. 
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unruly conduct is alleged, that the child is in need of treatment or 
rehabilitation.386 
In addition, the petition must make the parent aware of the specific 
circumstances supporting the proposed termination.387  Furthermore, the 
petition must include specific facts that will be used to terminate the 
parental rights so that any opposing parent has notice of the claims and is 
given an opportunity to “meaningfully prepare a defense against the 
petition.”388 
Sorum’s petition included sufficient factual basis for the requested 
termination of parental rights.389  The factual basis included numerous do-
mestic violence disputes, a history of abusive behavior, I.B.’s own concerns 
regarding his ability to financially support the children, and the failure of 
either parent to continue treatment for the children’s disorders, as well as 
their own.390  Based on the factual findings made by the trial court, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court determined that I.B.’s due process rights were 
not violated because he was made aware of the evidence that Sorum relied 
on, and I.B. did not appear to be prejudiced at trial or unable to defend 
against the charges.391 
Next, I.B. argued that the referee improperly delegated judicial author-
ity to Sorum by assigning her the preparation of proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and then adopting those findings in whole.392  In 
North Dakota, a trial court may delegate the duty of preparing findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to one or both parties.393  Rule 52(a) of the 
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
The findings of a master or juvenile referee, to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court.  
It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of 
the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision 
filed by the court.394 
While a court’s adoption of one party’s proposed findings of fact is 
discouraged, once the court signs those findings, they become the court’s 
 
386. Id. ¶ 6, 709 N.W.2d at 15 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-21(1) (2005)). 
387. Id. ¶ 7 (citing Thompson v. King, 393 N.W.2d 733, 738 (N.D. 1986)). 
388. Id. (citing In re Interest of T.M.M., 267 N.W.2d 807, 813 (N.D. 1978)). 
389. Id. ¶ 8. 
390. Id. 
391. Id. 
392. Id. ¶ 9, 709 N.W.2d at 16. 
393. Id. ¶10 (citing N.D.R.CT. 7.1(b)(1)). 
394. Id. (quoting N.D.R.CIV.P. 52(a)). 
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findings and will not be thrown out unless clearly erroneous.395  Even where 
the trial court announces its decision via letter and asks the triumphant party 
to prepare the findings, the decision will not be reversed.396 
Here, the judicial referee’s decision was communicated by letter and 
requested that Sorum prepare the findings of fact.397  The findings were 
adopted in whole by the referee and signed.398  The supreme court held that 
the findings were not clearly erroneous, and therefore, affirmed the trial 
court’s ruling.399 
In North Dakota, the standard of review for rendering whether a 
parent’s rights should have been terminated is “clearly erroneous.”400  The 
North Dakota Century Code requires, where parental rights are at stake, that 
the petitioner prove by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) ‘the child is a 
deprived child,’ (2) ‘that conditions and causes of deprivation are likely to 
continue or will not be remedied,’ and (3) ‘that by reason thereof the child 
is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or 
emotional harm.’”401  In North Dakota, a court’s termination of parental 
rights will be upheld unless the decision is clearly erroneous, meaning that 
“no evidence exists to support the finding, or if, on the entire record, [the 
court is] left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake ha[d] been 
made.”402  North Dakota Century Code defines a deprived child as: 
[one] without proper parental care or control, subsistence, 
education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for 
the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals, and 
the deprivation is not due primarily to the lack of financial means 
of the child’s parents, guardian, or other custodian.403 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has defined proper parental care as the 
“minimum standards of care which the community will tolerate.”404 
Based on the record, the supreme court found that sufficient evidence 
existed to hold that the children were deprived.405  The evidence included 
 
395. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Foster v. Foster, 2004 ND 226, ¶ 10, 690 N.W.2d 197; N.D.R.CIV.P. 
52(a)). 
396. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Foster, ¶¶ 7, 10, 690 N.W.2d 197). 
397. Id. ¶ 12. 
398. Id. 
399. Id. ¶ 15, 709 N.W.2d at 17-18. 
400. Id. ¶ 13 (citing N.D.R.CIV.P. 52(a)). 
401. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1)(b) (2005); In re Interest of M.M.S., 449 
N.W.2d 574, 577 (N.D. 1989)). 
402. Id.  (citing Adoption of S.R F., 2004 ND 150, ¶ 8, 683 N.W.2d 913, 916)). 
403. Id. ¶ 14 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(8)(a) (2005)). 
404. Id. (citing Interest of D.Q., 2002 ND 188, ¶ 12, 653 N.W.2d 713, 719). 
405. Id. ¶ 15. 
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the lower court’s findings that: (1) the children were deprived; (2) the 
family’s home was “unkempt”; (3) the parents exhibited violent behavior 
toward one another; and (4) the children suffered abuse and the threat of 
abuse at the hands of I.B.406  In addition, the lower court noted other 
instances in which I.B. did not meet the minimum standard of care in 
parenting his children.407 
But in North Dakota, parental rights will not be terminated unless 
prognostic evidence is provided showing that deprivation is “likely to con-
tinue or will not be remedied.”408  Prognostic evidence includes the lack of 
cooperation displayed by the parents, the parents’ background, and the 
reports and opinions of professionals involved.409 
Based on the conclusions of a social worker, a parent aide, two thera-
pists, and M.B. and N.B.’s mother, the supreme court held that sufficient 
evidence existed to find that continued deprivation would occur if the 
children were returned to I.B.410  Despite I.B.’s alleged desire to be reunited 
with the boys, his prior avoidance of interaction with the boys, the boys’ 
fear of I.B., and I.B.’s lack of understanding regarding the effort required to 
provide for the children were held to be substantial grounds to find that 
continued deprivation would occur.411 
Finally, the North Dakota Century Code requires the petitioner to prove 
that the “child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, 
moral, or emotional harm” if not removed from the care of the parent.412  
Based on prognostic testimony, the supreme court found that I.B.’s parental 
rights should be terminated.413  The evidence included the boys’ past 
exposure to mental and physical abuse, sexual abuse, and violent and 
pornographic films.414 
In I.B.’s final argument regarding the termination of his parental rights, 
he claimed that reasonable efforts had not been made by Cass County 
 
406. Id. 
407. Id. 
408. Id. ¶ 16, 709 N.W.2d at 18 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1)(b)(1) (2005)). 
409. Id. (citing Interest of T.K., 2001 ND 127, ¶ 14, 630 N.W.2d 38, 44; Interest of A.S., 
1998 ND 181, ¶ 19, 584 N.W.2d 853, 856-57; Interest of D.Q., 2002 ND 188, ¶ 21, 653 N.W.2d 
713, 721),  
410. Id. ¶ 17, 709 N.W.2d at 18-19. 
411. Id.  The court further noted that since the boys had entered foster care their behavior had 
improved and that a proper caregiver-child relationship had been established with the foster 
parents.  Id. 
412. Id. ¶ 18, 709 N.W.2d at 19 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1)(b)(1) (2005)). 
413. Id. ¶ 19. 
414. Id. 
        
2006] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1073 
Social Services to return the boys to his care.415  The North Dakota Century 
Code has stated that “reasonable efforts” means: 
[t]he exercise of due diligence, by the agency granted authority 
over the child . . . to use appropriate and available services to meet 
the needs of the child and the child’s family in order to prevent 
removal of the child from the child’s family or, after removal, to 
use appropriate and available services to eliminate the need for 
removal and to reunite the child and the child’s family.  In deter-
mining reasonable efforts to be made with respect to a child under 
this section, and in making reasonable efforts, the child’s health 
and safety must be the paramount concern.416 
The supreme court concluded, based on sufficient testimony received 
by the referee, that “reasonable efforts” were attempted.417  I.B. did not take 
part in the boys’ counseling.  Among other evidence, I.B. did not improve 
the boys’ living space and was continually at odds with his desire to have 
parental control over M.B. and N.B.418 
Finally, I.B. contested the denial of visitation rights.419  Based on the 
court’s previous holding that sufficient evidence was produced to terminate 
I.B.’s parental rights, the court deemed the issue of his right to visitation as 
moot.420 
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order of the juvenile 
court.421 
 
 
 
 
 
 
415. Id. ¶ 20. 
416. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-32.2(1) (2005)) (emphasis added).  The North 
Dakota Century Code further provides that reasonable efforts must be made to preserve and 
reunify families prior to the placement of the child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need 
for removing the child from the child’s home and to make it possible for a child to return safely to 
the child’s home.  If the court or the child’s custodian determined that continuation of reasonable 
efforts is inconsistent with the permanency plan for the child, reasonable efforts must be made to 
place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency plan and to complete 
whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child.   N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 27-20-32.2. 
417. In re M B., ¶ 21, 709 N.W.2d at 19. 
418. Id. I.B. took little interest in parenting, as was evident from his behavior in not 
maintaining his home, in rarely being home, and in sleeping all day when he was at home.  Id. 
419. Id. ¶ 22, 709 N.W.2d at 20. 
420. Id. (citing In re Interest of L.B.B., 2005 ND 220, ¶ 9, 707 N.W.2d 469, 472; Wanner v. 
N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 201, ¶ 31, 654 N.W.2d 760, 773) 
421. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. 
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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
DAVIS V. KILLU 
 
In Davis v. Killu,422 Anthony Davis appealed from a judgment entered 
on a jury verdict dismissing a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Keith 
Killu, Dr. Philip Hershberger, and other healthcare providers.423  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.424 
In May 2000, Davis was experiencing pain in his right ankle, so his 
urologist referred him to Dr. Killu, an internal medicine physician, who 
diagnosed Davis with cellulites and possible osteomyelitis.425  Upon diag-
nosis, Davis was admitted to the hospital for an antibiotic IV.426  Despite 
the intravenous drip, Davis’s condition did not improve, and Dr. Killu con-
sulted an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Hershberger.427  Dr. Hershberger deter-
mined that treatment of Davis’s left ankle required incision and drainage, 
debridement, and exploration of the bone.428  In addition, Dr. Hershberger 
initiated a six-week course of intravenous antibiotics when Davis was 
released from the hospital on June 30, 2000.429 
On July 11, 2000, Davis returned to Dr. Killu who was convinced that 
his condition had improved and continued administering antibiotics for 
another six weeks.430  Dr. Killu recommended that Davis should follow up 
with the orthopedic clinic.431  On July 28, 2000, Davis saw Dr. Ravindra 
Joshi, another orthopedic surgeon, who determined that a blister on Davis’s 
foot tested positive for blastomycosis, a fungal infection of the bone that 
does not respond to antibiotics.432  Because the fungal infection could not 
be treated, Davis’s leg was amputated in August 2000.433 
In February 2002, Davis commenced a malpractice action against Dr. 
Killu and Dr. Hershberger, alleging that they were negligent in failing to 
timely diagnose and treat the infection in his ankle.434  Davis specifically 
claimed that he lost his leg because of the doctors’ alleged negligence.435  In 
 
422. 2006 ND 32, 710 N.W.2d 118. 
423. Davis, ¶ 1, 710 N.W.2d at 119. 
424. Id. at 120. 
425. Id. ¶ 2. 
426. Id. 
427. Id. 
428. Id. 
429. Id. 
430. Id. ¶ 3. 
431. Id. 
432. Id. 
433. Id. 
434. Id. ¶ 4. 
435. Id. 
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August 2004, a jury found that neither of the doctors were negligent in the 
care and treatment of Davis.436 
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Davis argued that the 
trial court’s evidentiary rulings constituted reversible error.437  Specifically, 
Davis argued that the trial court erred in refusing to allow his medical 
expert to testify, admitting evidence that he had been fired from his employ-
ment, and excluding evidence of Dr. Hershberger’s licensing status.438  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that trial courts are given broad 
discretion to rule on evidentiary matters, and a trial court’s rulings will not 
be overturned unless an abuse of discretion has occurred.439  Rule 61 of the 
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides that no judgment shall be 
overturned unless refusal to admit or exclude evidence “appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice.”440 
First, Davis argued that the trial court erred when it refused to allow the 
testimony of a medical expert, Dr. Henry Masur, regarding opinions con-
tained in Davis’s original Mayo Clinic medical records.441  The trial court 
redacted physicians’ opinions from the records for the purpose of trial, and 
Davis argued that Dr. Masur should have been allowed to testify with 
respect to those opinions.442  In redacting the physicians’ opinions from 
Davis’s medical records, the trial court relied on the ruling in Patterson v. 
Hutchens,443 which did not admit the opinion of a physician, who was 
neither a witness at trial nor was available for cross-examination.444  Here, 
no Mayo Clinic physicians testified at trial.445  Therefore, based on the 
reasoning in Patterson, the parties agreed to redact the physicians’ opinions 
in Davis’s Mayo Clinic medical records before admitting those records into 
evidence, and accordingly the trial court ordered the redaction of the 
physicians’ opinions.446  Then, Dr. Hershberger brought a motion in limine 
to exclude Dr. Masur from testifying as to his medical opinions that had 
 
436. Id. 
437. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 14, 17, 710 N.W.2d at 120-24. 
438. Id. 
439. Id. ¶ 6 (citing Forster v. W. Dakota Veterinary Clinic, 2004 ND 207, ¶ 40, 689 N.W.2d 
366). 
440. Id. (citing N.D.R.CIV.P. 61)  (stating “[n]o error in either the admission or the exclusion 
of evidence. . . is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, 
modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears 
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice”). 
441. Id. ¶ 7. 
442. Id. 
443. 529 N.W.2d 561 (N.D. 1995). 
444. Davis, ¶ 8, 710 N.W.2d at 121 (citing Patterson, 529 N.W.2d at 564-65). 
445. Id. 
446. Id. 
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been redacted from the records.447  Although Davis made no offer of proof 
to the specific testimony, he contended that the trial court’s ruling was 
“plain error,” in violation of Rule 703 of the North Dakota Federal Rules of 
Evidence, which provides: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases 
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known 
to the expert at or before the hearing.  If of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence.448 
Davis asserted that Dr. Masur should have been allowed to testify as to the 
redacted opinions in the medical records because the opinions constituted 
facts or data reasonably relied upon by Dr. Masur to form his expert 
opinion.449 
Historically, the North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that expert 
witnesses “should be permitted to describe otherwise inadmissible hearsay 
relied upon in order to give the basis for the opinion”450  Yet, the court has 
recognized that it would be an injustice if expert witnesses were allowed 
“free reign” as a mouthpiece for inadmissible hearsay.451  In order to 
balance this contradiction, courts have weighed the probative value of the 
hearsay with the danger of unfair prejudice, pursuant to Rule 703 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.452  In Davis’s case, the unaltered portions of the 
record were not present on appeal, and the record showed that Davis made 
no offer of proof.453  The court found that because these critical elements 
were absent, it was unable to determine whether the evidence that would 
have been presented was an attempt to allow the jury to hear inadmissible 
hearsay or would assist Dr. Masur in relaying his expert opinion.454  
Therefore, the court could not state whether or not the trial court abused its 
discretion in excluding the evidence.455 
Next, Davis argued that the trial court erred in admitting testimony as 
to his termination of employment from Tioga High School.456  Davis 
 
447. Id. 
448. Id. ¶ 9 (citing N.D.R.EV. 703). 
449. Id. 
450. Id. ¶ 10 (quoting State v. Messner, 1998 ND 151, ¶ 26, 583 N.W.2d 109, 114). 
451. Id. at 122. 
452. Id. ¶ 11 (citing United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
453. Id. ¶ 13, 710 N.W.2d at 123. 
454. Id. 
455. Id. (citing Forster v. W. Dakota Veterinary Clinic, 2004 ND 207, ¶ 43, 689 N.W.2d 366, 
382). 
456. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. 
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claimed that testimony as to his termination of employment was irrelevant 
and inadmissible.457  On direct examination, Davis discussed his employ-
ment background, and on cross-examination he was asked if he was termi-
nated from his teaching position at Tioga High School.458  Davis’s counsel 
objected, and the trial court ruled that the reasons for his termination must 
be excluded as prejudicial, but the termination testimony itself was 
admissible to complete the picture of his employment background.459 
The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed that the questioning 
regarding the termination of Davis’s employment was irrelevant.460  But the 
court would not overturn the trial court’s admittance of the testimony 
because such testimony did not affect Davis’s substantial rights.461  As 
evidence that Davis’s substantial rights were not affected, the court stated 
that the testimony had no bearing on the weight of the jury’s finding that 
Dr. Killu and Dr. Hershberger were not negligent in treating Davis.462  
Therefore, admission of testimony regarding Davis’s termination from 
employment was harmless error.463 
Next, Davis argued that the trial court erred in prohibiting evidence 
regarding Dr. Hershberger’s licensing status.464  While being deposed, Dr. 
Hershberger suggested that he was not licensed to practice at UniMed 
Medical Center in Minot, but rather was only licensed to practice at the 
affiliated clinic, Medical Arts Clinic.465  Before trial, Dr. Hershberger raised 
a motion in limine to exclude the testimony as to his licensing status.466  At 
the in limine hearing, Hershberger’s counsel stated that Hershberger was 
licensed to practice in North Dakota, and that UniMed Medical Center is 
affiliated with Medical Arts Clinic in which Hershberger was licensed to 
practice.467  On the fourth day of trial, a question arose regarding the 
resolution of this evidence.468  When the issue was raised, the record 
showed that Davis’s counsel failed to object, which prevented Davis from 
preserving an objection on the record for appeal.469  Therefore, Davis’s 
 
457. Id. ¶ 15. 
458. Id. 
459. Id. 
460. Id. ¶ 16. 
461. Id. (citing In re K.S., 2002 ND 164, ¶ 11, 652 N.W.2d 341, 346). 
462. Id. at 123-24. 
463. Id. at 124. 
464. Id. ¶ 17, 710 N.W.2d at 124. 
465. Id. at ¶ 18. 
466. Id. 
467. Id. 
468. Id. ¶ 19. 
469. Id. ¶ 20 (citing May v. Sprynczynatyk, 2005 ND 76, ¶ 25, 695 N.W.2d 196, 203). 
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failure to object at trial resulted in a waiver of later claiming error on the 
issue.470  In addition, the court stated that the evidence as to licensing may 
have been relevant in a negligence suit against the clinic and medical 
center, but it had no bearing on the negligence of Dr. Hershberger.471 
In conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed all three 
evidentiary issues.472 
 
MENTAL HEALTH—INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT 
IN RE INTEREST OF M.M. 
 
M.M. appealed two orders issued by the District Court of Stutsman 
County.473  The first order mandated the hospitalization of M.M. at the 
North Dakota State Hospital for a period not to exceed forty-five days, and 
the second order mandated involuntary treatment with medication.474  M.M. 
argued that he was not mentally ill, he did not require medical treatment, 
and involuntary hospitalization and treatment were not the least restrictive 
alternatives to his medical care.475 
M.M. was a fifty-five year old male, who was admitted to Trinity 
Hospital in Minot, North Dakota, because of a complaint that he was unable 
to urinate.476  M.M. refused surgery when learning that kidney stones were 
the cause of his urinary retention.477  While being treated, hospital staff 
noticed M.M. displayed grandiose delusions.478  Upon witnessing these 
behaviors, a psychiatric consultant filed a Petition for Involuntary Commit-
ment based on statements that were termed to be psychotic and 
delusional.479  M.M. was then sent to the state hospital, where he was 
treated without surgery.480 
Upon entering the state hospital, M.M. told Dr. Pryatel that he was a 
grey ghost involved with military intelligence and a stunt man.481  At trial, 
Dr. Pryatel stated his belief that M.M. was a homeless hitchhiker, who 
 
470. Id. 
471. Id. 
472. Id. ¶ 21. 
473. In re M.M., 2005 ND 219, ¶ 1, 707 N.W.2d 78, 79. 
474. Id. 
475. Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 707 N.W.2d at 80. 
476. Id. ¶ 2, 707 N.W.2d at 79. 
477. Id. 
478. Id. ¶ 3.  M.M.’s delusions included statements where he claimed to be able to speak 
many languages, be related to famous people including the President of the United States, and 
exist as a color.  Id. 
479. Id. 
480. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. 
481. Id. ¶ 5. 
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panhandled for money.482  During his hospitalization, M.M. was capable of 
feeding himself and sustained sufficient personal hygiene.483  Dr. Pryatel 
also testified that M.M.’s kidney condition presented serious risks if un-
treated.484  Dr. Pryatel testified that surgery, in combination with medicine, 
was M.M.’s only treatment option.485  Furthermore, Dr. Pryatel had serious 
doubts regarding M.M.’s ability to function in society or manage his 
medical condition.486 
M.M. argued that he was not in need of medication or surgery to 
maintain his physical or mental health.487  M.M. asserted that his physical 
condition was not life threatening and claimed that he was not mentally ill 
because he had not been diagnosed with any mental illness in the past, nor 
had he experienced episodes of inflicting injury upon himself or others.488  
M.M. testified that the statements made at Trinity Hospital were a result of 
him being in intense pain.489  Unlike the previous statements that he made 
at Trinity Hospital, at trial M.M. stated that he was not related to any 
presidents, but he did state that he had performed stunts and that he was 
fluent in both Russian and Chinese.490  Based on this evidence, the trial 
court found that M.M. was in need of involuntary hospitalization.491 
In North Dakota, a trial court has the power to order an involuntary 
commitment of an individual under certain circumstances.492  Involuntary 
commitment is appropriate when the petitioner proves by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the individual was mentally ill, and if not treated 
would pose a serious risk to himself, others, or property.493  The supreme 
court reviewed the trial court’s findings under a “clearly erroneous” stan-
dard of review.494  The supreme court determined that M.M.’s behavior at 
Trinity Hospital, combined with Dr. Pryatel’s opinion that M.M. was 
mentally ill, was enough to support the trial court’s finding of his mental 
illness.495 
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483. Id. 
484. Id. 
485. Id. 
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487. Id. ¶ 7, 707 N.W.2d at 80. 
488. Id. 
489. Id. 
490. Id. 
491. Id. ¶ 8. 
492. Id. ¶ 9. 
493. Id. ¶ 9 (citing In re Interest of D.Z., 2002 ND 132, ¶6, 649 N.W.2d 231, 234). 
494. Id. 
495. Id. ¶ 10, 707 N.W.2d at 80-81. 
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M.M. argued that he did not require treatment because he was not a 
physical threat to himself, others, or property.496  But “[w]hen one or more 
reasonable inferences can be drawn from credible evidence, this Court must 
accept the inferences drawn by the trial court.”497  Here, expert testimony 
was provided to demonstrate that without medical attention M.M.’s condi-
tion would result in renal failure, which would cause M.M. to be a danger to 
himself.498 
M.M. also argued that the trial court erred in ordering involuntary 
commitment rather than ordering some less restrictive treatment.499  M.M. 
relied on North Dakota law, which provided that “[w]hen an individual is 
found to be a person requiring treatment he has the right to the least restric-
tive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of the treatment.”500  A 
two-part inquiry is required to determine the least restrictive environment: 
“(1) whether a treatment program other than hospitalization is adequate to 
meet the individual’s treatment needs; and (2) whether an alternative 
treatment program is sufficient to prevent harm or injuries which the 
individual may inflict upon himself or others.”501  Furthermore, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court requires a trial court to show by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that alternative treatment was not adequate, or that 
hospitalization was the least restrictive alternative.502 
During trial, the court heard testimony from Dr. Pryatel that hospital-
ization and medication were the only effective treatment for M.M.’s 
psychiatric condition.503  Because M.M. was a homeless transient, no 
outpatient or rehabilitation arrangements could be made, leaving involun-
tary commitment as the only option.504  Taking into consideration the 
testimony of Dr. Pryatel and M.M.’s needs, the trial court found that 
involuntary hospitalization did not violate his rights, and therefore, was the 
least restrictive medical treatment.505 
M.M’s final argument on appeal was that the trial court erred in 
permitting involuntary treatment using medication.506  Dr. Pryatel requested 
authorization to treat M.M. with a variety of different medications, as 
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500. Id. (quoting In re Interest of D.Z., ¶ 10, 649 N.W.2d at 235). 
501. Id. (quoting In re Interest of D.Z., ¶ 10, 649 N.W.2d at 235). 
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necessary, to treat M.M.’s condition.507  Dr. Pryatel was of the opinion that 
M.M.’s mental health would improve substantially from the administration 
of the medication.508  But in order for a trial court to authorize the 
involuntary administration of medication, the treating psychiatrist and 
another licensed physician must certify the medication order, and the court 
must find by clear and convincing evidence, the following factors under 
section 25-03.1-18.1 of the North Dakota Century Code: 
“1.a. Upon notice and hearing, a treating psychiatrist may request 
authorization from the court to treat a person under a mental health 
treatment order with prescribed medication.  The request may be 
considered by the court in an involuntary treatment hearing.  As a 
part of the request, the treating psychiatrist and another licensed 
physician or psychiatrist not involved in the current diagnosis or 
treatment of the patient shall certify: 
(1) That the proposed prescribed medication is clinically 
appropriate and necessary to effectively treat the patient and 
that the patient is a person requiring treatment; 
(2) That the patient was offered that treatment and refused it 
or that the patient lacks the capacity to make or communicate 
a responsible decision about the treatment; 
(3) That prescribed medication is the least restrictive form of 
intervention necessary to meet the treatment needs of the 
patient; and 
(4) That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the known 
risks to the patient.”509 
The trial court found that all of the factors listed in section 25-03.1-
18.1 were proven by clear and convincing evidence.  Using Dr. Pryatel’s 
testimony, the supreme court found that the trial court’s finding was not 
clearly erroneous.510  The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court’s finding that M.M. was a mentally ill individual requiring involun-
tary hospitalization and treatment.511 
Justice Kapsner wrote a dissenting opinion.512  In her dissent, Justice 
Kapsner argued that M.M.’s refusal to submit to surgery was not sufficient 
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510. Id. ¶ 16. 
511. Id. ¶ 17. 
512. Id. ¶¶ 22-24, 707 N.W.2d at 83-84 (Kapsner, J., dissenting). 
        
1082 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82:1033 
evidence to diagnosis him as being mentally ill.513  Additionally, Justice 
Kapsner questioned the trial court’s finding that M.M. was mentally ill, 
citing the fact that M.M. was competent to testify and was maintaining 
daily living activities even though he was not medicated.514 
 
PERSONAL INJURY LAW—NEGLIGENCE—SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PEREZ V. NICHOLS 
 
In Perez v. Nichols,515 the district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of defendant Ronnie Nichols, stating that no reasonable jury could 
find Nichols negligent of injuries sustained by the passenger in his vehicle 
at the time of the accident.516  On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme 
Court, Sheila Perez, the passenger and plaintiff, argued that questions of 
fact still existed regarding “whether Nichols kept a proper lookout while 
entering an intersection and whether Nichols was negligent for not having 
his van equipped with seat belts.”517  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.518 
In Green v. Mid Dakota Clinic,519 the North Dakota Supreme Court 
defined summary judgment as: 
a procedural device under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56 for prompt and 
expeditious disposition of a controversy without a trial if either 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and if no dispute 
exists as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn 
from undisputed facts, or if resolving disputed facts would not 
alter the result.520 
Additionally, “the party moving for summary judgement must show 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the case is appro-
priate for judgment as a matter of law.”521  The court also noted that all 
favorable inferences will be drawn in favor of the opposing party, and the 
 
513. Id. ¶ 20-21, 707 N.W.2d at 83 (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (citing Cruzan v. Director Mo. 
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evidence will be construed most favorably to the opposing party.522  As 
speculation will not defeat a motion for summary judgment, the court 
requires the opposing party to provide “competent admissible evidence by 
affidavit or other comparable means” that will show the court what 
evidence raises an issue of material fact.523 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that a claim of negligence 
requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, 
the defendant breached his duty, and the defendant proximately caused the 
plaintiff’s injury.524  As here, “[t]he driver of an automobile has a duty to 
keep a proper lookout, and failure to discharge that duty is negligence.”525  
If the evidence presented could result in only one reasonable conclusion by 
a reasonable fact-finder, only a question of law exists and summary judg-
ment may be appropriate.526 
First, Perez argued that Nichols failed to keep a proper lookout.527  
Perez stated that Nichols failed to survey the intersection before entering it, 
and if he had properly surveyed the intersection, then Nichols would have 
observed the oncoming car.528 
Upon examining the facts in the light most favorable to Perez, the court 
found that Nichols did not breach his duty to keep a proper lookout.529  The 
court noted that Nichols had proceeded into the intersection on a green 
light, following two other vehicles.530  Additionally, the court found that 
Perez contradicted herself because she was unable to identify how Nichols 
could have avoided the accident and she did not believe that Nichols caused 
the accident.531  Furthermore, the court found important Nichols’ testimony, 
in which he testified that he properly surveyed the intersection before 
entering it.532  The court held that these facts, even in the most favorable 
light for Perez, could not sustain a claim that Nichols had “breached his 
duty to keep a proper lookout or that Nichols proximately caused Perez’s 
injuries.”533 
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Next, Perez argued that Nichols had a duty to equip his van with safety 
belts.534  Nichols and Perez both testified that safety belts were available in 
the van, but Perez had chosen a bench seat that was not equipped with 
safety belts.535  The court easily rejected Perez’s argument because Nichols’ 
van did contain seats with safety belts, and Nichols did not instruct Perez 
where to sit.536  Because Perez raised no issues of material fact, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.537 
In a special concurrence, Justice Maring remarked that the court is 
without proper evidence to determine whether Nichols had an opportunity 
to see the oncoming car that failed to yield the right-of-way and avoid the 
collision regardless of his right of way.538  “It is the lack of that evidence 
that justifies the summary judgment.”539 
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